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George W. Van Cleve
Charles Tiefer"
In its Iran-Contra investigation, Congress faced legal challenges
which evolved logically from the two-century long history of Congres-
sional investigations, and yet at the same time were unmatched in their
significance. One challenge concerned "use" immunity, and its
employment when high advisers to the President faced parallel
Congressional and criminal proceedings. A second concerned the
investigation of a secret international "Enterprise," which, like similar
enterprises, was established overseas to carry on international opera-
tions without public accountability, and was protected by multiple layers
of secrecy sanctioned by law. This article addresses how history brought
Congress to those challenges, and how Congress met them, because they
are the two major legal obstacles to contemporary Congressional
investigations.
Part One begins with a discussion of factors influencing the timing
of congressional investigations and the conflict between such investiga-
tions and parallel or subsequent criminal investigations and prosecu-
tions. It then analyzes key developments in the law of immunity since
Watergate. Next, this part reviews the employment of use immunity in
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Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice. He was
formerly Chief Minority Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives Select Commit-
tee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. B.A., University of
Chicago, 1973; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1977.
** Mr. Tiefer is Deputy General Counsel to the Clerk of the U.S. House of
Representatives. He was formerly Special Deputy Chief Counsel, U.S. House of
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the Watergate and Iran-Contra congressional investigations. After a
general treatment of the employment of use immunity in those
investigations, the article considers two types of problems with the use
of the federal immunity statute: first, significant interpretive problems
under the statute and second, problems in enforcing immunity orders.
Part Two begins with a survey of the expanding use of international
enterprises whose operations are deliberately concealed from United
States executive and congressional authorities by a web of foreign
secrecy laws. As an example of such concealment, it then describes the
legal artifices used to create and hide the North-Secord Enterprise and
the operation of that Enterprise in the Iran-Contra Affair. Next, Part
Two considers the strengths and weaknesses of the three basic legal
tools available to the United States in investigating such enterprises:
treaties, compelled confidentiality waivers, and compelled or negotiated
transfer of information through immunization or other means. It
analyzes the use of these tools in the Iran-Contra investigation. Part
Two then considers the overseas reach of United States process for
individual and corporate evidence, the barriers created by bank secrecy
laws, and techniques of international investigation.
PART ONE
I. THE EMPLOYMENT OF "USE" IMMUNITY IN PARALLEL
CONGRESSIONAL AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
A. Introduction
The history of the Watergate and Iran-Contra investigations by
Congress shows that grants of testimonial or "use" immunity' are very
often indispensable tools of major congressional investigations. Yet,
such grants of immunity intensify the conflict between key purposes of
Congressional investigations and those of the criminal justice system by
1. Under federal law, testimonial or "use" immunity (technically referred to
as "use and derivative use immunity") is granted by an immunity order which
compels testimony over a claim of fifth amendment privilege. The law provides
that neither the testimony so compelled, nor any evidence derived therefrom,
may be used in any subsequent prosecution against the witness except for
perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1985). Because the immunity from prosecution conferred by
the statute is coextensive with the scope of the fifth amendment privilege,
immunized testimony can constitutionally be compelled over a claim of privilege.
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). "Use or derivative use" immunity
is distinguishable from transactional immunity, an immunity from prosecution
for offenses related to the compelled testimony. Id at 453.
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erecting a potentially formidable barrier to subsequent criminal
prosecutions. 2 If they are not properly timed or employed once made,
grants of testimonial immunity may block otherwise successful criminal
prosecutions by making it difficult or impossible for prosecutors to meet
their "heavy burden" of demonstrating that their cases are not tainted
by the immunized testimony given before the Congress.?
Improperly made grants of immunity may also result in failed
congressional investigations. If an immunity is granted prematurely,
a thorough investigation may not be able to be conducted. Immunity
also may be granted improvidently, by giving it to a witness who should
not be immunized, thus assisting an individual who should be prosecut-
ed to escape prosecution.4 Finally, even when an immunity is granted,
it may not be able to be enforced so that an investigation cannot
proceed.
Given this tension between the need for congressional investiga-
tions to employ use immunity and the possibility that using it may
defeat the ends of the criminal justice system, one of the first orders of
business for a major congressional investigation which precedes or
parallels related criminal investigations or prosecutions will be to
navigate the shoals of use immunity. The first part of this article
discusses the task of such navigation, with particular emphasis on how
this challenge was met in the Iran-Contra investigation.
2. See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYs' MANUAL § 1-11.212 (1977) (gives a prosecutor's view of the diffi-
culties of prosecution after a grant of immunity).
3. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461. The Watergate Special Prosecution Force
described the problems posed by the investigation conducted by the Senate
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities [hereinafter Senate
Watergate Committee] in the following manner: "The danger existed that
legislative hearings might frustrate the criminal proceedings. For example...
the Committee planned to immunize [several important witnesses], thus barring
any prosecution which could be shown to be based on any direct or indirect use
of their Senate testimony." UNITED STATES WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION
FORCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT 6 (1975) [hereinafter
WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE].
4. It is essentially for this reason that, as James Hamilton said, "A
Congressional committee normally grants immunity to a witness only when
convinced that his testimony will produce new and vital facts previously
undisclosed by the investigation." J. HAmILTON, THE POWER TO PROBE: A,




1. The Timing of Congressional Investigations
It would be desirable if conflicts between congressional investiga-
tions and criminal prosecutions could be avoided. This could be done
either by allowing prosecutions to precede investigations, or by deciding
in advance in particular cases that, in view of the necessity for
legislative factfimding, there would not be any criminal prosecutions.
In the case of a major congressional investigation, however, there
may well be both considerations of general policy and more immediate,
sometimes partisan, political reasons which lead Congress to be
unwilling to wait for the conclusion of criminal prosecutions before
beginning an investigation. In the case of the Iran-Contra affair, for
example, there was a widespread public feeling that the country needed
to determine whether the events under investigation called for system-
atic reform of the national security decision-making process, a question
which could not easily be deferred for two or three years pending the
outcome of criminal investigations and prosecutions.5  This public
sentiment was reflected in the prompt appointment of the President's
Special Review Board (Tower Board) with a very short reporting
deadline and the virtual unanimity of both Houses of Congress in
promptly authorizing massive investigations, despite their foreign policy
sensitivity, also with relatively short deadlines. 6 Of course, there was
5. PRESIDENT's SPECIAL REvIEW BOARD, REPORT, at I-1 (Feb. 26, 1987).
Similarly, James Hamilton, Assistant Chief Counsel to the Senate Watergate
Committee, reported that during the Watergate investigation the Senate
Watergate Committee unanimously rejected Special Prosecutor Cox's request
that the Committee delay hearings during his investigation. According to
Hamilton: "It was Senator Ervin's view that informing the nation immediately
of the full parameters of the Watergate affair was the country's most pressing
need." THE POWER TO PROBE, supra note 4, at 20. Cox then unsuccessfully
argued in court that the Committee's ability to obtain immunity orders for
certain witnesses should be made. conditional on court-imposed limits on the
broadcasting of their testimony. I&L
6. The President's Special Review Board was established by Executive Order
No. 12,575, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,718 (1986). The Executive Order gave the Board
sixty days to report. Id The Senate Select Committee on Military Assistance
to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition (hereinafter Senate Select Committee)
was established by S. Res. 23, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), which passed by a
vote of 88-4 on January 6, 1987. The resolution gave the Senate Select
Committee an August 1, 1987 reporting deadline. Id § 9. The House Select
Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran (hereinafter
House Select Committee) was established by H.R. Res. 12, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987), which passed the House by a vote of 416-2 on January 7, 1987. The
resolution gave the House Select Committee an October 30, 1987 reporting
deadline. Id § 12. The House and Senate Select Committees are hereinafter
[Vol. 55
LESSONS OF THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR
a feeling in some quarters that a promptly begun, extensive Congressio-
nal investigation that continued for some time would maximize the
critical political scrutiny received by the Administration for the affair
itself.
The Iran-Contra affair also points out the common difficulty in
deciding at the outset of, or during, an investigation that no criminal
prosecutions should be brought. Congress generally strives to avoid a
decision on such a point which can be second-guessed effectively later.
In the early stages of the Iran-Contra investigation, no one in
Congress was entirely sure what had happened. There was a possibility
that there had been any number of events of which Congress was
unaware. Congress initially had access to only a small part of the
available relevant documents. It was apparent from the beginning
that certain major witnesses were likely to exercise their fifth amend-
ment right against self-incrimination in response to any significant
questions. Also, there was early and persistent disagreement within the
Congressional committees about whether certain conduct which had
allegedly occurred violated any law, let alone about whether the conduct
was criminal. For these reasons, the Committees decided to act in a
manner that would hold open the possibility of subsequent criminal
prosecutions as they proceeded with their investigation and hearings.8
No limits are imposed on Congress' decisions about the timing of
investigations other than those established by public opinion and court
decisions on prejudicial publicity, the latter of which generally impose
relatively minor limits.9 The absence of such limits, increased use of
the Independent Counsel statute, and commonly found circumstances
counseling prompt congressional investigations, make it reasonable to
referred to collectively as the "Iran-Contra Committees" or "the Committees."
7. The first public disclosures, in early November 1986, occurred subsequent
to the adjournment of Congress on October 18 of that year. The Intelligence
Committees of both Houses, and certain other committees of jurisdiction, quickly
began investigations, but time permitted them to gather only a small portion of
the relevant evidence before Congress decided in early December to establish
special investigating committees.
8. The Committees' reservation was best exemplified by the early decisions
to delay the North and Poindexter immunities against the wishes of some
members. Felton, Senate Report Lays Out Details of Iran, Contra Arms
Dealings, 45 CoNG. Q. 182, 184-185 (1987); Felton, Select Panels Combine
Activities, Set Immunity, 45 CONG. Q. 509-10 (1987); Felton & Pressman, Hill
Panels, Special Counsel Wrestle with Immunity Issues, 45 CoNG. Q. 464 (1987).
Incidentally, the decisions played a principal role in transforming the investiga-
tion from one conducted behind closed doors by national security and foreign
policy experts to one conducted in front of the cameras by criminal lawyers.
9. Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1968); Delaney v.
United States, 199 F.2d 107 (lst Cir. 1952).
1990]
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expect that there often will be major parallel criminal and congressional
investigations.
2. The Effect on Immunity Decisions of the Conflict Between
Congressional Investigations and Criminal Justice
Congressional investigations of government action have an
important informing function in which public scrutiny, criticism, and,
possibly, legislative action may create political accountability for actions
under review.'0 Congressional investigations also may expose conduct
which the executive branch then decides to treat as criminal."
No matter how harsh the political judgment ultimately made by the
congressional majority in power about the conduct investigated might
be, however, Congress is constitutionally prohibited, by article I of the
Constitution, from acting to punish individuals for the conduct under
investigation. 12 As the Supreme Court has said, Congress is not "a law
enforcement or trial agency.' 13 An outgrowth of the prohibition against
Congressional sanctions has been the recent custom that Congress
generally will not accuse specific individuals of having committed
specific crimes, except when this forms part of "judicial" actions
envisioned for Congress by the Constitution, such as the impeachment
process. 4 Congress increasingly is confining itself voluntarily to
making judgments about the political legitimacy of conduct, not its
criminality.
The rationale for these constitutional restrictions is not hard to
find. Congressional investigations tend, by their nature as very
substantial grants of power with fluid boundaries, to collapse the
distinction between the political legitimacy of conduct and its criminali-
ty if there is advantage to be gained from collapsing this distinction.
10. THE POWER TO PROBE, supra note 4, at 127-29.
11. See Silverthorne, 400 F.2d at 633-34; Delaney, 199 F.2d at 109-10.
12. Article I provides that "[n]o Bill of Attainder... shall be passed." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323
(1867). Congress may enact laws of general application which may also apply
to persons under investigation as long as they do not run afoul of the ex post
facto clause. Article I provides that "[n]o... ex post facto Law shall be passed."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798).
13. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
14. THE POWER TO PROBE, supra note 4, at 281 (Senate Watergate
Committee report intentionally did not allege specific criminal acts by
individuals); REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMS. INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-
CONTRA AFFAIR, H.R. REP. No. 433,100th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1987) [hereinafter
IRAN-CONTRA REPORT].
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Because Congress cannot impose criminal sanctions on the specific
individuals it investigates, congressional investigations may be
conducted, without raising constitutional questions, under procedures
which do not provide criminal defendants with many of the procedural
protections available to them in a court of law.'5 Since such investiga-
tions have no, or very few, procedural rules to prevent directly, or
indirectly, the collapse of the distinction between unpopular and
criminal conduct, the courts have tended to be skeptical of imposing
unwarranted criminal sanctions on witnesses.
1 6
Yet, congressional powers whose use may conflict with the purposes
of criminal justice sometimes are indispensable to Congress' execution
of its constitutional responsibilities. One such example is the power to
grant testimonial immunity. The Supreme Court has observed that
many congressional investigations are of offenses which could not be
examined effectively without such power.'" Although the immunity
power is exercised on the basis of statute, it is likely that the Supreme
Court would hold that it involves an inherent power of Congress
necessary to the exercise of its legislative function.'
8
By sharply expanding Congress' ability to investigate, however, the
necessary exercise of the immunity power heightens the conflict which
sometimes occurs between congressional efforts to expose and control
politically imprudent conduct and the purpose of the criminal justice
system to apportion criminal guilt. In recognition of this potential
conflict, the courts have hedged the exercise of the powers to grant
immunity and to conduct investigations by insisting that their use not
limit the constitutional rights of potential criminal defendants to a fair
15. See United States v. Fort, 443 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 932 (1971) (upheld the constitutionality of denying the right of cross-
examination). As further examples of this, note that examination of congressio-
nal committee rules shows that the committees do not normally observe formal
rules of evidence, or allow cross-examination of witnesses, and arguably are not
required to observe traditional privileges against testimony such as the attorney-
client privilege, though they often do the latter. See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON
RULES, RULES ADOPTED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 115-28 (1987) (Rules of the Committee on Foreign Affairs).
16. THE POWER TO PROBE, supra note 4, at 235. "[The tendency of courts
in contempt situations where liberty is at stake is to restrict the powers of
Congress .... ." Id.; see also id. at 208-45 (discusses the fact that on many
occasions courts in contempt situations have required very strict compliance
with the minimal procedural rules that apply in congressional proceedings).
17. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446-47 nn.14-15 (1972).
18. This is strongly suggested by the reasoning of Anderson v. Dunn, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821), the landmark decision which held that Congress
possessed an inherent contempt power on this basis.
19901
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trial.'9 Therefore, when Congress exercises these powers, it needs to
do so with a recognition that the courts will require that Congress
exercise the powers prudently if it wishes to maintain the possibility of
subsequent criminal prosecutions. This will entail a measured effort by
Congress to compare the needs of the particular congressional investiga-
tion with the rights of any potential criminal defendants that are
implicated by that investigation.' And this, in turn, will require a
grasp of the law governing immunity grants.
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF IMMUNITY
SINCE WATERGATE
Shortly before the Watergate investigation began, the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the federal "use or derivative use"
immunity statute in Kastigar v. United States.2' The principal issue
in the case law since Kastigar has been what prosecutors will have to
do precisely to meet the "heavy burden" of showing that their prosecu-
tions are not tainted by immunized testimony. The Supreme Court
described this burden as including an "affirmative duty to prove that
the evidence [the prosecution] proposes to use is derived from a
legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony.
' 22
The most difficult questions encountered in interpreting the
requirements of Koatigar have had to do with the non-evidentiary use
of immunized testimony by prosecutors.' In the typical case, a
defendant seeks to have an indictment dismissed on the ground that
prosecutors or grand juries had access to immunized testimony and may
in some manner have relied on it to make decisions connected with the
proposed prosecution. The courts appear to have split in their interpre-
tation of the Kastigar requirements.
19. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461-62; Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d
627,633-34 (9th Cir. 1968) (prejudicial publicity); Delaney v. United States, 199
F.2d 107, 113-14 (1st Cir. 1952) (prejudicial publicity).
20. Delaney, 199 F.2d at 114.
21. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
22. Id. at 460-61.
23. Non-evidentiary uses of testimony are its uses for purposes other than
presentation as evidence. For example, testimony might be used for developing
trial and negotiation strategy or developing cross-examination. For largely, if
not completely, opposing views of the validity of the non-evidentiary use of
immunized testimony under Kastigar and the fifth amendment, see Humble,
Nonevidentiary Use of Compelled Testimony: Beyond the Fifth Amendment, 66
TEx L. REv. 351 (1987); Strachan, Self-Incrimination, Immunity, and Watergate,
56 TEx. L. REv. 791 (1978).
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One distinct view is that the prosecution must be able to prove not
only that its proposed evidence at trial was obtained independently of
the immunized testimony or its fruits, but also that none of the
prosecution's decisions concerning trial strategy or tactics were tainted
by such information.24 Both the Third Circuit, in United States v.
Semkiw, 25 and the Eighth Circuit, in United States v. McDaniel,
26
have adopted as a standard that the government must show that
"defendant and prosecution remained in substantially the same position
as if the defendant had not testified," and that this includes the effects
of immunity testimony on matters such as plea bargaining strategy,
evidence interpretation, planning cross-examination, and general trial
strategy.
27
In United States v. Byrd,' the Eleventh Circuit took a contrary
position. There, the court held that under Kastigar it would not
"inquire into a prosecutor's motives in seeking indictment" when one of
the prosecutors who had access to immunized testimony participated in
the indictment decision.2 It held that the Third and Eighth Circuit
holdings in United States v. Semkiw ° and United States v.
McDaniel,31 respectively, would effectively convert use immunity into
transactional immunity.12 With respect to trial, the Byrd court further
held that the Kastigar requirements could be met either by a showing
that the trial prosecutors had not had access to the immunized
testimony or by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the
evidence to be adduced at trial was derived from independent
sources." This, too, differed from the position taken in McDaniel and
Semkiw which would not have allowed the latter showing when
prosecutors had such access.3
In addition, courts appear to disagree on the standard of proof
required to make the necessary Kastigar showing. Some courts, such as
the Eleventh Circuit in Byrd, hold that a "preponderance of evidence"
24. See United States v. Semkiw, 712 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1983); United
States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973).
25. 712 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1983).
26. 482 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973).
27. Semkiw, 712 F.2d at 893-94; McDaniel, 482 F.2d at 311.
28. 765 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1985).
29. Id. at 1530.
30. 712 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1983).
31. 482 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973).
32. Byrd, 765 F.2d at 1531.
33. Id.
34. Semkiw, 712 F.2d at 895; McDaniel, 482 F.2d at 311.
1990]
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standard is sufficient,' while other courts appear to require "clear and
convincing" evidence that there is no taint of the government's evidence
or trial work.3
Under the most stringent reading of the Kastigar requirements, the
government would be required to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that both its evidence and all of its litigation decisions were based on
evidence obtained independently of the immunized testimony, including
any leads which might have been obtained from persons who had heard
the immunized testimony. This burden often has proven to be a difficult
one for prosecutors to carry in situations in which immunized testimony
has been presented, even in secret to a grand jury prior to trial.
Recognizing this problem, even the Byrd court, which proposed a
relatively lenient standard of proof, stated that it would "be unwise to
permit an attorney familiar with the immunized testimony to partici-
pate in the trial or preparation of the case."
3 7
As a practical matter, in a situation in which the immunized
testimony will be presented on nationwide television and radio
broadcasts, as in a major congressional hearing, to successfully protect
itself against taint claims, the prosecution will quite likely need to seal
the evidence composing its case before the public testimony begins.
38
If this is not done, the prosecution will have difficulty proving that any
evidence it collects after the beginning. of the testimony was not
collected either by investigators who had been exposed to the testimony
or from individuals who had themselves been exposed to the testi-
mony.39 In addition, the prosecution may need to take clear and strict
35. See, e.g., United States v. Hampton, 775 F.2d 1479, 1485 (11th Cir.
1985); United States v. Contreras, 755 F.2d 733,735 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 832 (1985).
36. United States v. Smith, 580 F. Supp. 1418, 1422 (D. N.J. 1984) (cites
other cases requiring clear and convincing evidence).
37. Byrd, 765 F.2d at 1532.
38. For a discussion of this procedure, see Strachan, supra note 23, at 812
n.97, 814-15 n.107; WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, supra note 3, at
6.
39. This latter possibility has been a major focus of the attack by the Iran-
Contra defendants on the procedures used by Independent Counsel to avoid
taint. In the Oliver North trial, the defendant asserted that the testimony of
various grand jury witnesses was tainted because they had heard immunized
testimony of one or more of the Iran-contra defendants. Defendant argued that
Independent Counsel should be required to prove that the testimony of these
witnesses was not altered by the tainted information. Judge Gesell rejected this
argument. United States v. Poindexter, 698 F. Supp. 300 (D.D.C.) (order
denying motions to dismiss on taint grounds), appeal denied, petition for
mandamus denied, appeal dismissed, 859 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1988). However,
Judge Gesell required that the grand jurors in the North trial remain free of
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affirmative steps to shield its prosecutors from exposure to the
immunized testimony, which may include a ban on listening to radio
and television news broadcasts. If these steps are taken, they may be
sufficient to shield a prosecution against taint claims.
4 °
To make these steps by a prosecution effective, however, a
congressional committee may need to be willing to alter the timing of its
activities to suit the needs of a prosecution, since by acting prematurely
the committee may preclude an effective defense by the prosecution
against taint claims. As will be seen below, there have been assertions
that such coordination would be legally impermissible.
III. THE EMPLOYMENT OF USE IMMUNITY IN THE WATERGATE
AND IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATIONS
A. General
Both the Senate Watergate Committee and the Iran-Contra
Committees depended heavily on the use of immunity grants to build
their investigations. According to Hamilton, "[t]o get to the bottom (or
the top) of many crimes, it is necessary to secure the testimony of one
of the wrongdoers .... Historically [to circumvent the privilege against
self-incrimination] the immunity mechanism has been widely used-the
Ervin Committee, for example, conferred immunity on twenty-seven
witnesses."4 ' Nor were the witnesses granted immunity by the Ervin
Committee minor witnesses in the Watergate Affair. They included:
John W. Dean III, Jeb Stuart Magruder, G. Gordon Liddy, Gordon
Strachan, and Donald Segretti, among others.4" According to another
knowledge of North's immunized testimony. Id at 309.
40. The Iran-Contra prosecutions may provide a good case to test whether
the Kastigar requirements can be met in a prosecution following a major
congressional investigation which relies heavily on immunized testimony. So far
as can be determined from court papers, Judge Walsh has taken most, if not all,
of the precautions which could reasonably have been taken to protect against
taint. See infra note 47 for discussion of these precautions. If Judge Walsh's
actions do not meet the Kastigar requirements, Congress should probably
conclude that its grants of immunity in major investigations will likely preclude
subsequent prosecution of immunized individuals. This result would force
Congress to become more discriminating in granting immunity, and to confront
the question whether it is worth pursuing an investigation if the price is the loss
of criminal sanctions against the individuals investigated.
41. THE POWER TO PROBE, supra note 4, at 78.
42. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AcTIvrrIEs, FINAL
REPORT, LEGAL APPENDIX, S. REP. No. 93-981, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2154-55
(1974). All but one of the witnesses who received immunity and were indicted
later pled guilty to one or more offenses. Strachan, supra note 23, at 814.
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observer, "[t]he United States Senate and the Watergate Special
Prosecution Forces (WSPF) employed use and derivative use immunity




The Iran-Contra Committees also granted immunity to substantial
numbers of very significant witnesses. The Committees granted
immunity to twenty-six witnesses. 44 Most immunity grants were made
by unanimous votes of the Committees, and even with respect to the
non-unanimous votes there was limited dissent.45 Included among the
witnesses granted immunity were the individuals who generally were
regarded as principal figures in both the congressional and the criminal
investigations: Albert Hakim, Oliver North, and John Poindexter. The
Committees also immunized a number of other figures significant in
both investigations.4 6
Judge Walsh, the Iran-Contra Independent Counsel, recognized
from the beginning that he would need to take extraordinary steps to
protect his criminal investigation against taint by the congressional
investigation, and acted accordingly.4" Judge Walsh wisely made clear
However, the prosecution against the immunized witness who refused to plead
was later dismissed with prejudice by the Watergate Special Prosecution Force
partially because of the "significant possibility" that the defendant would prevail
on taint claims after giving public immunized congressional testimony. Id. at
819 n.126. Another Watergate indiktment was also dismissed with prejudice on
motion of the Special Prosecutor, apparently for similar reasons. Memorandum
of the Independent Counsel Concerning Use Immunity, at 7 (Jan. 13, 1987)
(submitted to the congressional Iran-Contra Committees).
43. Strachan, supra note 23, at 814.
44. IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 14, at 686.
45. W. Cohen & G. Mitchell, Men of Zeal: A Candid Inside Story of the
Iran-Contra Hearings 39-41 (1988).
46. E.g., Fawn Hall, Robert C. Dutton.
47. According to Judge Gesell, Independent Counsel took numerous steps
to avoid exposure to immunized testimony:
[S]teps... were taken by Independent Counsel from an early date to
prevent exposure of himself and his associate counsel to any immu-
nized testimony. Prosecuting personnel were sealed off from exposure
to the immunized testimony itself and publicity concerning it. Daily
newspaper clippings and transcripts of testimony before the Select
[Iran-Contra] Committees were redacted by non-prosecuting "tainted"
personnel to avoid direct and explicit references to immunized
testimony. Prosecutors, and those immediately associated with them,
[Vol. 55
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to the Committees at an early point that he held the view that the
Committees' decisions about their investigation would take primacy over
his work and that he would not seek to interfere with those decisions.
In addition, Judge Walsh and his staff took steps to make certain
the Committees were aware of his views on various immunity issues
within the limits imposed by grand jury secrecy rules, and to accommo-
date the decisions of the Committees on immunity issues.
48
From the beginning of their work, the Committees were acutely
aware of the potential for conflict between the investigation and possible
prosecutions by the Independent Counsel.49 On January 13, 1987, only
a few days after the Committees formally were established, Judge
Walsh sent to the Committees a legal memorandum opposing grants of
immunity for any persons under investigation by the Independent
Counsel before completion of that investigation, principally on grounds
of the formidable difficulties such immunity grants would pose for
subsequent prosecutions. On that date, Judge Walsh also sent to the
Committees a memorandum describing legal issues posed by the
relationship between the Committees and the Independent Counsel,
were confined to reading these redacted materials. In addition, they
were instructed to shut off television or radio broadcasts that even
approached discussion of the immunized testimony. A conscientious
effort to comply with these instructions was made and they were
apparently quite successful. In order to monitor the matter, all
inadvertent exposures were to be reported for review of their possible
significance by an attorney, Douglass, who played no other role in the
prosecution after the immunized testimony started. The court has
reviewed in camera a file maintained by Douglass which consists of
his miscellaneous papers recording, often in cryptic terms, incidents
where Mr. Walsh, an Associate Independent Counsel, paralegal or a
senior staff member inadvertently were exposed .... In a very few
situations the employee was detailed to wholly unrelated work
[because of exposure] at the employee's own suggestion or by
Douglass.
United States v. Poindexter, 698 F. Supp. 300, 312-13 (D.D.C. 1988). Judge
Gesell also discussed extensively the precautions taken by Independent Counsel
to shield grand jurors from immunized testimony. Id. at 317-27.
48. As contemplated by the immunity statute itself, Judge Walsh and his
prosecutorial staff met periodically with the senior staff of the Iran-Contra
Committees to discuss various matters related to the Committees' immunity
actions. See 18 U.S.C. § 6005(b)(3), (c) (1985); see infra note 70 for discussion
of this matter. In addition, Judge Walsh appeared before the Committees to
present the views of Independent Counsel on significant immunity matters. W.
COHEN & G. MITCHELL, supra note 45, at 39-42.
49. Judge Walsh was appointed on December 19, 1986 by the special three-
judge panel with jurisdiction under the independent counsel statute. See 28
U.S.C. § 49, 591-599 (1988).
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particularly the issues raised by the transfer of information from the
Independent Counsel to the Committees and vice versa.
5"
The principal action taken by the Committees in response to these
concerns, -which were expressed by members of the Committees and
their staffs as well, was to delay the grants of immunity to certain key
witnesses to give Judge Walsh time to build his cases independently of
the Committees' investigation of those witnesses.5 ' Where the de-
mands of the investigation and hearing process required the Committees
to grant immunities earlier than Judge Walsh would have preferred,
extraordinary and generally successful precautions were taken by the
Committees to insure against disclosure of information obtained by
compelling testimony in executive session.
52
Within the Committees, the principal difference of opinion between
members on immunity matters concerned the timing of the immunity
grants, with some members favoring early grants of immunity to major
witnesses, while a substantial majority of the Committees favored
deferral of the issue in deference to the concerns of the Independent
Counsel.
The Committees Report Appendix defends the grant of immunity
to Albert Hakim principally on the grounds that he controlled access to
Swiss bank records of various transactions which the Committees
otherwise could not obtain. The Committees obtained these records by
virtue of the immunity grant long before these records were obtained by
the Independent Counsel through a different method,' and there is no
50. See Memorandum of the Independent Counsel Concerning Use
Immunity, supra note 42; Memorandum of the Independent Counsel Concerning
the Relationship Between the House and Senate Select Comms. and the
Independent Counsel (Jan. 13, 1987).
51. This was exemplified by the Committees' early decisions to defer the
question of immunity for North and Poindexter against the wishes of certain
members after Judge Walsh appeared before the Committees to oppose these
immunities. See supra note 8 for discussion of these delays.
52. Generally speaking, an executive session of a committee is one which
only committee members, its designated staff, and witnesses, if any, are
permitted to attend. Its proceedings may not be publicly discussed. C. TIEFER,
CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 160-61 (1989). For example, 6ecurity
precautions were taken with respect to the May 2, 1987 executive session
deposition of John M. Poindexter. See infra text accompanying note 61 for
description of these precautions.
53. The Committees obtained the records in April, 1987 by compelling their
production by Albert Hakim at a deposition in Paris, France. The Independent
Counsel obtained them about four months later through Swiss court process
against Swiss banks pursuant to an application filed under a United States-
Switzerland treaty. Pressman, Walsh Wins Rounds on Records, Role, 45 CONG.
Q. 1944 (1987). -
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assurance that even after the Independent Counsel had obtained them
he would or could have provided them to the Committees or that the
Committees could have obtained them through the method used by the
Independent Counsel.' The Committees Report Appendix characteriz-
es the evidence obtained from bank records and Hakim's compelled
testimony as "indispensable... in tracing the flow of money in the Iran-
Contra affair."
55
The Committees' decision to grant immunity to Oliver North, a
"principal target of the criminal investigation," is characterized in the
Committees' Report as "not an easy one" and defended on the grounds
that "the Committees' failure to obtain North's testimony would leave
the record incomplete."' ' The Committees Report Appendix notes that
the Committees agreed to defer North's testimony until the latter stages
of the Committees' investigation, to strike a balance between the needs
of the Independent Counsel and those of the Committees.'
Thus, both the Senate Watergate Committee and the Iran-Contra
Committees found that they could not investigate properly the events
they had been charged to investigate without employing grants of
immunity to substantial figures in the investigation. The need for the
use of immunity grants was particularly acute in the Iran-Contra
investigation because of the difficulties posed by the foreign secrecy laws
which were in effect in a number of the jurisdictions in which individu-
als under investigation had operated businesses or conducted transac-
tions. This problem, one of substantial proportion, is the second major
obstacle to the conduct of successful contemporary Congressional
investigations, and is discussed in Part Two of this article.
2. Problems in Enforcing Grants of Immunity
Once Congress decides to make a grant of immunity, problems in
the use of the immunity order are of two types: problems in the
interpretation of the immunity aithority, and problems in enforcing a
grant of immunity in the case of recalcitrant witnesses.
a. Key Problems in the Interpretation
of the Immunity Authority
After the Iran-Contra Committees had obtained an immunity order
to compel the testimony of Oliver North, North objected to the Commit-
54. IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 14, at 686-87.





tees' proposed procedures for the implementation of the immunity order.
North objected to two aspects of the Committees' proposed procedures
which are relevant here: the proposal that he be deposed initially by
Committee staff only, and the proposal that after any such executive
session proceeding, whether attended by members or staff or both, he
would then be required to testify again in public.58
The Committees had proposed an investigative deposition conducted
and attended only by staff principally for investigative purposes and
partially as a means of protecting against leaks of North's testimony
prior to his public testimony. As James Hamilton noted in his discus-
sion of the Senate Watergate Committee, the work of that Committee
was attended by many leaks, and there was reason to believe that a
number of those leaks came from members of the Committee.69 In fact,
Hamilton noted that one of the most sensitive documents ever prepared
by the Committee staff was not leaked, apparently because it was never
distributed to members of the Committee.'
For this reason, when the Iran-Contra Committees made arrange-
ments for an early deposition of John Poindexter for investigative
reasons, they agreed that the deposition itself would be conducted and
attended only by three senior staff attorneys for the Committees,
although the immunity orders were communicated to Poindexter with
a quorum of Committee members present.61 All notes of the deposition
were placed under seal immediately at its conclusion. Although
Poindexter's deposition covered the most sensitive political questions
raised during the entire Iran-Contra hearings, since much of his
testimony dealt with President Reagan's knowledge of and involvement
58. Letter from Brendan V. Sullivan, Jr. to Reps. Hamilton, Fascell &
Cheney, at 3-4 (June 17, 1987) (on file with the Missouri Law Review and the
House Select Committee files in National Archives) [hereinafter Sullivan Letter].
59. In the case of the Senate Watergate Committee, efforts to shield
testimony from disclosure often failed. THE POWER TO PROBE, supra note 4, at
273-300; Strachan, supra note 23, at 814 n.107. As Hamilton says:
[N]ever, it is safe to say, has Congress experienced such a frenetic
outpouring of supposedly confidential information .... The leaks
were the major stain on the Committee's performance. They severely
jeopardized its credibility and the integrity of its proceedings ....
[The leaks were illegal.., and arguably some of them had criminal
implications .... [I]t can be said with assurance that senators and
staff were the funnels for much of the confidential information that
mysteriously appeared in the public domain during the committee's
probes.
THE POWER TO PROBE; supra note 4, at 274-75.
60. THE POWER TO PROBE, supra note 4, at 281 (alleged involvement of
former President Nixon in Watergate coverup).
61. Poindexter's attorneys did not object to this deposition arrangement.
[Vol. 55
LESSONS OF THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAR
in various events, there were no leaks of this information prior to
Poindexter's public testimony several months later.
North objected to the staff deposition proposed in his case on the
ground that a deposition is not a proceeding before a house of Congress
or one of its committees or subcommittees. If this position was correct,
North reasoned, then, testimony given at such a deposition would not
be testimony covered by the immunity statute or the immunity order
issued pursuant to that statute. Therefore, the testimony could not be
compelled, and would not be protected by the immunity order if
given.
62
Even if North's position were correct,63 this defect in the proposed
procedures could easily have been cured by arranging for the attendance
at the deposition of three of the twenty-six members of the Iran-Contra
Committees (one Senator and two House members). Of course, curing
the problem in this manner would have created an increased risk of
public disclosure. Nevertheless, unless the immunity statute is
interpreted to cover depositions conducted without the presence of
members, this is a risk that would have had to have been taken.
North further objected to conducting a secret deposition to avoid
leaks. North contended that no valid legislative purpose would be
served by such a deposition, and, therefore, it could not be authorized
by either House." He contended further that House rules did not
permit a secret deposition to avoid leaks,6 5 and he objected on due
process grounds to the fact that he would not be given copies of his
62. See generally Sullivan Letter, supra note 58.
63. The Congressional Research Service provided the House Iran-Contra
Committee with a legal opinion taking the position that the better view was that
staff depositions were within the purview of the immunity statute. See
Memorandum from Jay R. Shampansky of the Congressional Research Service,
Library of Congress, American Law Division, to House Select Comm. to Investi-
gate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, "Applicability of Immunity Order to
Witness, Congressional Deposition Testimony" (June 22, 1987) (available in the
House Select Committee files in the National Archives). Apparently, the legal
question was considered significant enough that the Senate subsequently passed
a bill, S. 2350, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), designed in part to alter the
immunity statute to make this explicit. In its report on the bill, the House
Judiciary Committee expressed the view that existing law already provided that
staff depositions were covered by the immunity statute. H.R. REP. No. 100-
1040, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 3-4 (1988). The bill, which also contained a mildly
controversial amendment to the Senate's civil contempt powers, failed of passage
in the House on the suspension calendar, which requires a two-thirds vote for
passage, in the final days of the 100th Congress. We thank Jay Shampansky of
the Congressional Research Service for bringing this bill to our attention.
64. Sullivan Letter, supra note 56, at 15-17.
65. Id at 15.
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documents or contemporaneous transcripts or recordings of his
testimony at such a deposition.'
These arguments of North had little merit. The contention that
witnesses before Congress have a constitutional right to appear in
public-that no valid legislative purpose is served by an executive
session proceeding-flies in the face of the fact that Congress has a
right to determine the truth in support of its legislative, as well as its
informing functions.67 The longstanding use of secret grand jury
proceedings as a powerful tool of investigation should put to rest any
notion that the truthfinding process cannot be served properly by
secrecy." Therefore, Congress has a right to hold executive session
proceedings in support of its investigations.
North's argument that congressional executive session proceedings
may not incidentally assist, or be intended to assist, a prosecution by
minimizing the possibility of leaks and, thus, of taint is also mistaken
for several reasons.6 9 First, since Congress constitutionally can grant
66. Id at 17-22.
67. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
68. The Senate Watergate Committee appears commonly to have held
executive session proceedings with witnesses prior to their public testimony.
See, e.g., THE POWER TO PROBE, supra note 4, at 275-82. The House Judiciary
Committee held months of executive session hearings before beginning public
proceedings in the Nixon impeachment matter. HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT OF RicHARD M. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, H.R. REP. No. 1305, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974).
69. The principal cases cited by North, Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178 (1957), and United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1956), are
clearly factually distinguishable from the circumstances of the Committees'
proposed investigation of North. Watkins was a contempt proceeding against a
congressional witness for refusing to answer questions about previous
Communist Party membership by various individuals. The Supreme Court held
that in order to protect the constitutional rights of congressional witnesses it
would require a clear showing of the pertinency of the questions for which
Congress sought an answer to a legitimate legislative purpose, and also that a
potential witness was informed, or could be charged with knowledge, of such
pertinency, before upholding a contempt citation against a witness. Watkins,
354 U.S. at 208-09. Watkins expressly excluded congressional investigations
into, and publicity related to, "corruption, maladministration, or inefficiency in
agencies of the Government" from the scope of its holding. Id at 200 n.33. The
Committees' inquiry into North's conduct was therefore outside the scope of
Watkins. In addition, Watkins dealt with the substance of the inquiries
propounded to the witness, not with the procedures used to obtain the
information. See id. at 215. The Committees had no plans to inquire into
North's past or present political associations except as they were directly
relevant to events involving the use of governmental power and authority which
were plainly quite properly under investigation by the Committees. As Judge
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immunity limited to use and derivative use, rather than transactional
immunity, it seems to follow that Congress can act, then, in a manner
calculated to limit the effect of the immunity to its intended scope by
preserving the possibility of untainted prosecution.0 Second, courts
have made it clear that criminal prosecutors, whether they are
independent counsels or in the executive branch, will pay the price if
Congress decides not to stay its proceedings when there are criminal
proceedings pending. 1 It follows from this and basic separation of
powers principles, which counsel that the branches generally should not
function in a vacuum,7 2 that Congress may consider whether it wishes
to force this result or not. Third, courts clearly have recognized that
Congress' investigations actually may provide, and may be intended at
least partially to provide, information on which prosecutors may later
decide to act. 3 Therefore, it seems legitimate for Congress to decide
whether it wishes to provide s-6ch information. These latter points are
the clear implications of Delaney v. United States 4 and Silverthorne
v. United States,7 5 which together stand for the proposition that
Congress may choose its timing for investigations without legal
restraint, conducting hearings before or after criminal indictments issue,
but that the courts will protect defendants against incursions into their
Gesell noted, none of the Iran-Contra defendants now argues in court that the
congressional investigation represented "exposure for the sake of exposure."
United States v. Poindexter, 698 F. Supp. 300, 307 (D.D.C.), appeal dened,
petition for mandamus deniec, appeal dismissed, 859 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
Icardi involved a situation where a congressional committee undertook an
investigation which had no other purpose except to attempt to fix criminal
responsibility for an isolated crime which had occurred at a military installation
some years previously. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. at 384. Again, no such argument
can plausibly be made about the Iran-Contra investigation.
70. The immunity statute itself contemplates discussions between
prosecutors and Congress concerning the advisability and timing of any proposed
grants of immunity, and is also specifically designed to allow prosecutors time
to take steps to avoid taint which might occur as a result of such a grant. See
18 U.S.C. § 6005 (b)(3), (c) (1985); In re United States Senate Select Committee
on Presidential Campaign Activities, 361 F. Supp. 1270 (D.D.C. 1973).
71. Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1968); Delaney v.
United States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952).
72. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
73. Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1968); Delaney v.
United States, 199 F.2d 107 (lst Cir. 1952).
74. 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952).
75. 400 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1968).
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rights if Congress has decided to act without regard to the effect on
pending prosecutions.
76
In short, the operative principles seem to be the following.
Congress may not try criminal cases itself solely for the purpose of
trying such cases;7 7 and Congress could not agree with a prosecutor to
conduct an investigation solely for the purpose of providing evidence of
criminal conduct for a prosecutor.78  Congress certainly can act,
however, in a manner that is intended to minimize Congress' interfer-
ence with possible prosecutions and can provide assistance to such
prosecutions as an incident of its legislative investigations by providing
information it uncovers.
North's assertion that failure to provide documents in advance, or
contemporaneous transcripts or recordings, with respect to such an
executive session deposition violates due process is equally flawed.
Congress generally has broad power to structure its investigative
process in a manner designed to meet its legislative needs.7 9 There
does not appear to be any statutory or constitutional right of discovery
available to witnesses in front of Congressional committees. After all,
they cannot face any substantive penalties imposed by Congress as a
result, of their testimony, except for failure to provide testimony or
failure to tell the truth when doing so. A method of investigation
designed to elicit truthful testimony from persons who may not be
inclined to be truthful, for example, through denial of discovery by
refusing to provide documents or transcripts, can be defended readily as
within that authority.
North also complained that other witnesses, who did not assert
their fifth amendment privilege, were allowed to review their Committee
documents, while he was not. North's contention that denying
documents only to persons who have asserted their fifth amendment
privilege is constitutionally deficient, because it impermissibly burdens
the exercise of that constitutional right, is also mistaken. By drawing
such a distinction, Congress is not imposing a penalty, or denying a
right, in a constitutionally protected context. A congressional committee
may act on its conclusion that persons who have pled the fifth amend-
ment and then been compelled to testify are less likely to be willing to
cooperate with the truthfinding process than persons who have not.
This is so because the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination
directly protects only against sanctions in the criminal process, and its
exercise is further protected against burden by loss of limited rights in
76. Silverthorne, 400 F.2d at 634; Delaney, 199 F.2d at 114-15.
77. Cf. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 187 (1957); United States v.
Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1956).
78. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
79. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
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quasi-public property, not with respect to every conceivable civil
disability or distinction.
80
Finally, North's argument-that a witness cannot be made to testify
twice under compulsion, once in executive session and once in public,
lacks any serious force once it is clear that Congress can conduct
investigations in executive session. The usual point of an executive
session is to allow exploratory questioning, to seek leads, and so on.
The fact that after a committee has had a chance to sift the executive
session testimony, to compare it to the testimony of others, to examine
relevant documents, and to develop its approach to questioning the
witness, the witness would then be required to testify in public does not
in any way distinguish a congressional investigation's truthfinding
process from that of either the civil or criminal litigation process.
Witnesses routinely are questioned in depositions before civil trial, and
in grand jury before criminal trial. To suggest, as North did, that it is
somehow "unfair" or "punitive" to require repetitive testimony because
a witness may be indicted, or may have been indicted, whether for
perjury or any other offense, is effectively to complain that the witness
was not given transactional immunity rather than use immunity. The
Supreme Court has made it clear that transactional immunity is not
constitutionally required, and that witnesses given use immunity must
tell the truth.8 ' Indeed it would be remarkable to think that the
truthseeking process available to the Congress should be less powerful
than that available to ordinary litigants.
Considering that North's contentions on these points were without
substantial merit, the question remains why the Committees partially
acceded to some of North's proposals about the conditions under which
he would appear."2 This decision by the Committees has been criti-
cized, 3 but can be defended readily. The Committees were informed
that North would have been advised by counsel to refuse to answer
despite their immunity order, and to obtain North's compliance with the
order, the Committees would have had to hold North in contempt.
80. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977) (loss of political office);
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973) (loss of government contracts); Spevack
v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (revocation of lawyer's license); Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591 (1896); Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1026 (1974).
81. See Watkins, 354 U.S. at 215.
82. We emphasize that the Committees did not make a legally binding
agreement with North on these matters, and specifically inforned North that
they were unwilling to enter into any binding agreement. W. COHEN & G.
MITCHELL, supra note 45, at 149.
83. Id. at 149-51.
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It was the judgment of a large majority of the Committees that it
was more important to obtain North's testimony, with some possible
sacrifice in terms of the thoroughness of the Committees' preparation
and examination,8' than it was to impose a lengthy delay on the
Committee proceedings to try the legal issues raised by North in a
contempt proceeding. To understand the basis for this judgment, it is
necessary to consider the problems of enforcing a congressional
contempt citation.
b. Problems in the Use of the Contempt Power
There are presently three types of contempt power available to the
Congress: nonstatutory or inherent contempt power; statutory criminal
contempt power; and statutory civil contempt power (available only to
the Senate),8 5 The effort to use any of these forms of contempt power
would have delayed the testimony of Oliver North for a minimum of six
weeks, and possibly for as long as six months. In addition, there were
uncertainties about whether Congress actually would have been able to
use any of the forms of contempt authority against North. Finally, even
if North had been successfully cited for contempt, he could have refused
to testify and gone to jail.
Congress has not used its nonstatutory, or inherent, contempt
power since 1935.86 Its use has been criticized, 7 though it has its
defenders and its constitutionality cannot be doubted. 88 To the
authors' knowledge no one seriously suggested it should have been used
against North, although, in retrospect, considering the alternatives
available it might well have been the most attractive choice. If,
however, the House or Senate had held the required contempt trial, and
84. Id. at 148-49 (noting the assertion by Chief Counsel to the Senate Iran-
Contra Committee Arthur Liman to that Committee that North could be
effectively questioned under proposed constraints; this view was not universally
held).
85. Congressional Research Service.. Library of Congress, American Law
Division (Jay R. Shampansky), "Congress' Contempt Power," at 2 (Feb. 28,
1986). [hereinafter "Congress' Contempt Power"].
86. Id. at 11 (citations omitted).
87. See S. REP. No. 170, "95th Cong., 1st Sess. 97 (1977); Lee, Executive
Privilege, Congressional Subpoena Power, and Judicial Review: Three Branches,
Three Powers, and Some Relationships, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 231, 254-55 n.71.
88. Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496 (1972) (although it involved a state
legislature, by implication upholds the inherent contempt power of Congress);
Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935) (upheld the use of the inherent
contempt power of the Senate to punish an individual for obstruction of a Senate
inquiry even after the obstruction has ceased or its removal has become
impossible).
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ordered North imprisoned, North's attorneys undoubtedly would have
sought a writ of habeas corpus to determine whether North was
imprisoned properly, and the resulting constitutional litigation probably
would have continued until the full Supreme Court was asked to hear
the case. Of course, even if North ultimately had been held in con-
tempt, he could have chosen jail over testimony.
Congress' criminal contempt power established by statute is not
designed to elicit testimony, but to punish.89 In addition, there is a
critical uncertainty under the existing statute about whether the United
States Attorney will always pursue a contempt prosecution that is
referred to him by a house of Congress.9° If it had sought a criminal
contempt prosecution against North, Congress would have had to risk
being put in a position in which it could not force testimony at all,
either because the Department of Justice would not prosecute the
contempt or because North might successfully have defended against the
contempt, 9' or have been pardoned if convicted.
Finally, the Senate's civil contempt power may not have applied to
North, a former executive branch officer, since the Senate's statutory
power does not apply to executive branch officials in certain circum-
stances. 92  This was a significant enough legal issue that a suit
brought under this statute possibly would have been a lengthy detour.
Ironically, then, the Committees found themselves in a position in
which, despite the strength of their legal position, their ability to enforce
their immunity order was limited unless they were willing to endure a
lengthy delay while litigation to enforce the order was pursued to the
Supreme Court. Of course, even if the Supreme Court upheld any
contempt citation against North, North still had available the ultimate
defense against testimony: he could refuse to testify and go to jail
instead, as did G. Gordon Liddy during the Watergate-related hearings.
89. "Congress' Contempt Power," supra note 85, at vi.
90. Id.
91. This latter outcome seems unlikely if the issues were confined to those
raised in North's brief against the Committee investigative and hearing
procedures, for the reasons previously given.
92. Existing law limits the Senate's civil contempt power by providing that
it does not apply to executive branch officials when they are "acting within
[their] official capacity." 28 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988); see also HOUSE Comm. ON
THE JUDICIARY, CLARIFYING THE INVESTIGATIVE POWERS OF THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESS, H.R. REP. No. 1040, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988). North asserted
that he would be covered by this proviso, and there appeared to be a possibility
that this was so. The Senate therefore adopted legislation, S. 2350, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1987), to revise this exception to the scope of the civil contempt power
so that it clearly would not have applied to persons situated similarly to North.
Id at 2-4. However, the bill failed to pass the House.
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For these reasons, the Committees decided to strike a balance
between the benefits for the Congress in vindicating its undoubted right
to obtain North's testimony under its proposed procedures (or to have
him punished for failing to give it) and the needs of the Iran-Contra
investigation. As explained above, the Committees decided to forego the
marginal benefits which could have been gained from forcing the
Committees' proposed deposition procedure on North in return for the
expedition gained by his agreement to testify fully. This is certainly a
defensible choice. Having said that, however, it would be a gross
mistake for future potential witnesses before the Congress to conclude
that Congress has in any realistic sense conceded any of the legal issues
that North raised, or that a future Congressional committee would be
likely to reach the same balance of competing considerations reached in
North's case by the Iran-Contra Committees. Nevertheless, the
Congress should carefully review its contempt procedures to provide
additional needed authority to Committees faced with this problem in
the future.
PART TWO
I. CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF HIDDEN
"ENTERPRISES"
The congressional Iran-Contra investigation faced a ;najor
challenge in probing "the Enterprise," the name given to the operations
established by Major General Richard V. Secord which provided outside
support for the activities of North.93 This aspect of the investigation
required dealing with a maze of complex legal problems concerning the
investigation of secret international enterprises. By starting historically
with the rise of the nether world of such enterprises, and then a
description of the North-Secord Enterprise itself, the importance of the
legal protections for these entities, which amount to general barriers to
the investigations of Congress specifically and the authority of the
United States generally, becomes clear.
A. International Role of Hidden "Enterprises"
In recent decades, international financial "enterprises" have
flourished on a large scale, using overseas distance and foreign secrecy
laws to hide transactions and activities from United States scrutiny.
93. "One of the main objectives of the Committees was to penetrate this
secrecy-to find out where the money came from, and where it went; and thus,
to learn about the operations and organization of the enterprise." IRAN-CONTRA
REPORT, supra note 14, at 331.
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Such enterprises range from runaway private activities supporting
governmental activities, such as the North-Secord "Enterprise," to the
international financial infrastructure for corporate payments, organized
crime, narcotics trafficking, and tax and securities fraud. The Supreme
Court described the problem in 1974 in an opinion upholding new
statutory reporting requirements for banks and foreign financial
transactions.' As the Court explained,
following extensive hearings concerning the unavailability of foreign
and domestic bank records ... Congress was concerned about a
serious and widespread use of foreign financial institutions, located in
jurisdictions with strict laws of secrecy as to bank activity, for" the
purpose of violating or evading domestic criminal, tax, and regulatory
enactments.95
The authors emphasize that, despite their disparate motives and
means, secret international enterprises have in common the systematic
effort to structure operations to avoid their detection and control by
United States authorities. To achieve this end, they must generally rely
on certain specific legal protections afforded to them by foreign secrecy
laws and United States legal principles. This article will discuss below
the means that the government can use to overcome these barriers to
detection and control.
Multinational enterprises with a taste for concealed quasi-official
activity are hardly new. From the international oil cartel organized by
Standard Oil to the World War II work by international chemical and
electronics firms on behalf of both the Axis and the Allies, private
enterprise long has sought, by operating internationally, to circumvent
or override the law or policy of any one country.
Even by historical standards, a special era of international
"enterprises" began in the twentieth century, with the pioneering work
probably being organized crime's efforts to shield itself from local law
enforcement. A number of factors, including the highly publicized
congressional investigations by the Kefauver Crime Committee and the
McClellan Labor Racketeering Committee in the 1950s, along with law
enforcement efforts, drove organized crime to seek international
94. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
95. Id. at 27.
96. See generally A. SAMPSON, THE SEVEN SISTERS: THE GREAT OIL COMPA-
NIES AND THE WORLD THEY SHAPED 72-73 (1975); see also A. SAMPSON, THE
SOVEREIGN STATE OF lIT 33-43 (1973).
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refuge." In particular, Meyer Lansky, an unfortunately brilliant
innovator, developed the techniques of overseas operations and money
laundering to new heights. Lansky pioneered the use of bank secrecy
havens such as Switzerland, and the worth of investment in receptive
Third World countries, notably Cuba.9"
As late as the 1960s, United States law enforcement authorities
apparently paid little attention to the matter of hidden international
"enterprises." In that decade, Congressional investigations began the
exposure and analysis of the problem.9 Over the following two
decades, a host of congressional investigations and hearings studied the
problems of international "enterprises" shielding narcotics trafficking,
organized crime, and tax evasion."° The Supreme Court gave great
97. An historical account is provided by an investigative reporter in H.
MESSICK, LANsKY (1971). During the post-Prohibition era, as organized crime
moved more heavily into gambling, it invested in a number of "wide-open"
localities. The Kefauver Committee investigation impaired this effort.
Prior to the 1951 [Kefauver] hearings, Saratoga closed down again.
Similar action was taken in other corrupt cities ranging from Miami
Beach to Newport, Kentucky.... [T]he experience left [Lansky] more
convinced than ever that a sustained gambling operation should have
legal status or else be conducted offshore in the Caribbean. What's
more, some international banking resources would be helpful.
Id. at 164.
98. In 1951, "Lansky opened his first numbered bank account in Switzer-
land .... The bankers pointed out that not even Hitler had been able to break
down the traditional wall of secrecy with which their financial transactions were
protected from prying eyes." Id. at 170. In 1952, Fulgencio Batista took over
Cuba by coup, and the following year, Lansky led extensive organized crime
investment in gambling casinos for Cuba. Id. at 194-98. Along with funds being
laundered through a Miami bank, "[c]ash was also carried by courier to the
International Credit Bank of Switzerland. Once safely deposited in numbered
accounts there, it could be invested in the stock market or returned in the form
of loans to individuals and corporations controlled by the National Crime
Syndicate." Id. at 99.
1 99. The Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations started by
revealing the strong ties between the American and Sicilian Mafias, and
continued by uncovering the network of international traffic in stolen and
counterfeit financial instruments. House Committees received testimony from
Robert M. Morgenthau, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New
York, who had traced money laundering by organized crime. Foreign Bank
Secrecy and Bank Records: Hearings Before the House Committee on Banking
and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 18, 90 (1969-70).
100. For lists of the hearings, see Weiland, Congress and the Transnational
Crime Problem, 20 INT'L LAW. 1025, 1029-30, 1029 n.13 (1986). Mr. Weiland
had been chief counsel of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investiga-
tions.
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weight to the findings of the congressional investigations when
upholding laws aimed at supervising foreign currency transactions. The
Court quoted a House Report to provide a classic description of the
range of activities occurring through these enterprises:
Secret foreign bank accounts and secret foreign financial institutions
have permitted proliferation of 'white collar' crime; have served as the
financial underpinning of organized criminal operations in the United
States; have been utilized by Americans to evade income taxes,
conceal assets illegally and purchase gold; have allowed Americans
and others to avoid the law and regulations governing securities and
exchanges.., and have served as the cleansing agent for 'hot' or
illegally obtained monies."0
Justice Rehnquist commented, wryly, that previous generations
might not have adopted intrusive bank legislation only because they
"did not live to see the time when bank accounts would join chocolate,
cheese, and watches as a symbol of the Swiss economy."'0 2 Of particu-
lar interest, in view of the "Enterprise's" role in the alleged diversion of
the proceeds of the sale of arms to Iran, the Supreme Court quoted the
House Report regarding two particular uses of such foreign bank
accounts: that they "have served as essential ingredients in frauds
including schemes to defraud the United States [and] have covered
conspiracies to steal from the U.S. defense and foreign aid funds."
10 3
Congressional investigations in the 1970s moved beyond the purely
private aspects of the matter. The Senate Watergate Committee had
uncovered what proved to be the tip of the iceberg of international
financial maneuvers by intelligence agencies and corporations, notably
by Senator Howard Baker's path-breaking inquiries into the role of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Thereafter, Senator Frank Church
chaired a follow-up series of investigations of multinational companies
and intelligence activities. His hearings and reports publicized the
maneuverings of International Telephone and Telegraph in Chile and
elsewhere, improper corporate payments overseas by arms manufactur-
ers and other companies, and intelligence operations operated on
questionable authority throughout the postwar era. Together'with the
investigations of purely criminal enterprises, these later investigations
of intelligence and corporate activities highlighted both the importance,
and the difficulty, of scrutinizing hidden international enterprises.
101. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21,28 (1974) (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1970)).




A brief concrete description of such enterprises by type, with
examples, will aid the discussion of the legal issues that follows. The
particular subject of the Iran-Contra investigation can be called loosely
a private enterprise supporting government objectives, being staffed by
former government officials and being in the grey area of having an
agenda of privately supported and conducted covert action along with
purportedly legal -activity. Such enterprises are characterized by an
unclear but definite degree of cooperation with government agencies,
private motivations mixing patriotism and profit, and an absence of
accountability. The Iran-Contra enterprise, of course, had its unique
aspects, but it may not have been the only activity of that type. The
Castle Bank of the Bahamas in the 1960s and early 1970s, and the
Nugan Hand bank in Australia in the late 1970s, were both connected
with a number of American former high-level military and intelligence
officials. Both allegedly mixed the kind of unaccountable intelligence
cooperation and personal profit that characterized the enterprise of
Richard Secord, and both ended in scandals that only partially resolved
the mysteries hidden behind the international financial veil.1°4
Another type of activity with its start in the legal world but its
continuation in an international financial nether world consists of the
structures used by major corporations for making overseas payments to
foreign officials and middlemen. Both the Church Committee and the
Senate Watergate Committee contributed to an understanding of these
activities. A series of prosecutions, both before and after enactment of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, contributed to a contemporaneous
understanding of these structures.
105
Another great, but hidden, tributary to the international financial
river consists of flight capital, often with political overtones. One
author has noted that "flight capital from the rest of Latin America is
generally acknowledged as the source of most of the $35 billion
deposited in Panamanian banks.""'6 Congress faced the challenge of
104. For descriptions, see J. KWITNY, THE CRIMES OF PATRIOTS (1987). The
Castle Bank became the subject of an IRS inquiry that led to House hearings
and a Supreme Court case. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980);
Oversight Hearings into the Operations of the IRS (Operation Tradewinds,
Project Haven, and Narcotics Traffickers Tax Program): Hearings Before the
Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Government Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
105. For descriptions of corporate payments through international finance
channels, see PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE CASH
CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY
LAUNDERING 12 (1984) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED
CRIME].
106. Nadelmann, Unlaundering Dirty Money Abroad: U.S. Foreign Policy
and Financial Secrecy Jurisdictions, 18 INTER-AM. L. REv. 33, 63 (1986).
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investigating an enterprise akin to flight capital in the 1985-86
investigation of Ferdinand Marcos' real estate holdings in the United
States.
10 7
Finally, as noted aboge, organized crime, narcotics, tax, and
securities fraud make their own major contributions to the world, of
hidden international enterprises. By sheer volume, narcotics traffickers
create the greatest demand in international money laundering.' °
B. The North-Secord "Enterprise"
The "Enterprise" of the Iran-Contra affair grew out of the expertise
of individuals with experience in the world of hidden enterprises, who
then took on projects publicly unsurpassed in impact. During the
Vietnam War, Major General Richard V. Secord had been involved in
special operations with the CIA in Laos. In 1975-78, he headed the
United States Air Force mission to Iran, where he met Albert Hakim,
an Iranian businessman selling systems to the Iranian Air Force. When
Secord retired in 1983, he went into business with Hakim.i°9 Thus,
both Secord and Hakim knew intimately the world of international
intelligence and corporate operations.
Starting in 1971, Hakim obtained banking-type services from
Willard I. Zucker, a U.S. citizen and former Internal Revenue Service
lawyer residing in Switzerland. Zucker ran Compagnie de Services
Fiduciaries (CSF), a Swiss fiduciary company, which accepts and invests
clients' funds, keeps their books, and establishes tax haven offshore
companies. Zucker himself had done legal work for Bernard Cornfeld,
whose massive securities operation, Investor Overseas Services, had
been run as an overseas enterprise systematically avoiding the
jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission. As the Iran-
Contra Report observed, "[t]he client employing a Swiss fiduciary such
as CSF-which uses Panamanian or Liberian companies, Swiss bank
107. For discussions of the Marcos matter, see 133 CONG. REc. H698 (daily
ed. Feb. 27, 1986); Investigation of Philippine Investments in the United States:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Comm.
on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1985-86).
108. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 103, at 7.
109. IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 14, at 40; Testimony of Richard V.
Secord Joint Hearings Before the House Select Comm. to Investigate Covert
Arms Transactions with Iran and the Senate Select Comm. on Secret Military
Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 46-47
(1987) [hereinafter Testimony of Secord].
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accounts, and offshore trust accounts-buys a triple layer of secrecy, a
formidable barrier against identification of the location of money."110
By North's account, in 1984, as the Boland Amendments cut off CIA
funding for the Contras, CIA Director Casey "suggested General Secord
to [North] as a person who had a background in covert operations" who
could set up private entities for providing aid to the Contras."' Thus,
the Enterprise served as a means for North to tap into the expertise and
connections developed by past intelligence activities." 2 For a financial
infrastructure, Secord turned to Hakim, and they started by use of a
limited number of companies and bank accounts set up in secrecy
havens. As a key example, in 1985, Lake Resources, Inc. was incorpo-
rated in Panama with three Swiss citizens associated with CSF as its
initial officers and with a bank account at Credit Suisse in Geneva.
CSF had bank accounts in Switzerland, the United States, Bermuda,
Paris, and Brussels. When funds had to be transferred, the Enterprise
made wire transfers from banks in secrecy havens." 3
Once established, the Enterprise put its infrastructure and funds
to a dizzying set of purposes. In what was by no means the most
convoluted of laundering operations, the Enterprise provided a Contra
leader, Calero, with funds and Calero in 1985 provided over $90,000 in
travelers checks to North for hostage ransom operations. When North
needed an operational and financial infrastructure for an arms sale to
Iran in November 1985, he turned again to Secord, who used the Lake
Resources account at Credit Suisse, which became the model for
subsequent arms sales to Iran."'
110. IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 14, at 332. "Zucker, who had a
license to practice law in the United States, all the powers of a Swiss fiduciary,
an inside knowledge of the IRS, and experience in meeting the needs of clients
such as Hakim-was a covert operator's model banker, accountant, lawyer, and
money manager." Id.
111. Testimony of Oliver L. North: Joint Hearings Before the House Select
Comm. to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran and the Senate Select
Comm. on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition,
100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1-3, at 119 (1987) [hereinafter Testimony of North].
112. For operations, namely arms purchases and delivery, Secord turned to
business associates, notably Thomas Clines, whom he knew "from CIA days."
Testimony of Secord, supra note 107, at 50.
113. IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 14, at 354. The Enterprise could
make payments either directly with such wire transfers, by wiring funds to CSF
accounts which issued checks, or even by giving checks to associates of Hakim
or Zucker who would deposit them and provide cash. Id.
114. IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 14, at 179. The Lake Resources
account became famous when the Sultan of Brunei attempted to deposit ten
million dollars in it for the Contras. Those funds went astray because North or
his secretary had inverted two digits in providing the account number, and
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This deployment of the Enterprise realized what some have claimed
was an entire philosophy sanctioning the exercise of private power for
governmental purposes without accountability or oversight by public
institutions. By North's account, for which there is no written confirma-
tion, CIA Director Casey sought for North to set up "stand-alone, off-
shore commercial ventures," which would be "self-financing, independent
of appropriated monies," and "capable of conducting operations or
activities of assistance to U.S. foreign policy goals."" 6 A blueprint by
Hakim of the Enterprise (or at least what Hakim tried to do in
conducting the Enterprise) reflected the breadth of the Enterprise's
concept of its operations. 116 The blueprint listed the various secrecy
haven companies in the Enterprise, classifying them as collecting,
treasury, and operating companies. In the concept, collecting companies
received funds for a time, and then, when they became visible, were cast
aside to preserve secrecy. They sent their funds to the treasury
companies, each of which was responsible for funds for operations in a
distinct region of the world: South America, the Middle East, and Africa.
As the Iran-Contra Report noted, "The treasury companies show the
global scope of the plan.""1
7
Treasury companies would pass funds to operating companies each
of which performed specific operations, so that the exposure of any
single company would not bring down the entire n6twork. Thus, when
Costa Rica denounced the airstrip built from Enterprise funds, it
exposed Udall Resources, Inc., the operating company for an airstrip
constructed for the Contra resupply operation. North wrote to Poin-
dexter about Udall: "Damage assessment: Udall Resources, Inc. SA, is
a proprietary of Project Democracy [North's phrase for the Enterprise].
It will cease to exist by noon today. There are no USG fingerprints on
any of the operations."" 8 By likening Udall to a "proprietary," North
again invoked the traditional concepts of intelligence enterprises, in
which private companies serve as CIA proprietaries, thereby providing
services with a degree of disintermediation, secrecy, and deniability.
The Enterprise took in nearly $48 million, spending almost $35.8
million on a wide array of covert operations. The air resupply operation
supported the conduct of a small war, including acquisition df an air
force, building an air strip in Central America, purchase of arms on the
'landed in the account of a Swiss shipping magnate who redeposited them in an
account of his own. Id. at 352-53.
115. Testimony of North, supra note 109, pt. 1, at 3; Id. pt. 3, at 317.
116. North asked Secord to prepare the chart; Secord got the chart from
Hakim, who had it drawn on a computer with the assistance of NSF. Id.; IRAN-
CONTRA REPORT, supra note 14, at 333-34.
117. IRAN-CoNTRA REPORT, supra note 14, at 333.
118. Id at 335 (quoting PROF message).
1990]
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
global market from sources such as Eastern Europe, payments for flight
support services and for the salaries of crews, and hiring of an expert
mercenary, David Walker."' Also from that $35.8 million, the Enter-
prise spent $15.2 million on arms sales to Iran, serving as the middle-
man in an incredible series of secret international arrangements
between sworn adversaries, generating as a byproduct the famous
alleged "diversion."120 It should be noted that these other participants
had their own "enterprises" for providing secrecy. For example, Adnan
Khashoggi ran commercial activities in the United States, whose assets
often were shielded by as many as four layers of corporate shells, and
whose loan transactions with certain important Canadians were
conducted through offshore entities.'
2 '
Another $3.1 million went for such diverse activities as the
purchase of a Danish ship, the Erria, for covert operations; a project
with Drug Enforcement Agency agents for ransoming hostages; and the
supplying of radios to a political party of a foreign nation."2  Besides
conducting these operations, the Enterprise gave millions of dollars of
profits for its participants."
C. Procedure Used to Investigate the
North-Secord "Enterprise"
As the foregoing description shows, the Enterprise had buried itself
deep in layers of secrecy haven protections. The Congressional
investigation had three basic alternative routes for penetrating those
layers: obtaining records through treaty-defined government channels
from the banks involved; obtaining confidentiality waivers by the
participants and then using these to obtain records from the banks; or
some degree of compelled or negotiated surrender of records by
119. I& at 338.
120. The Congressional committees estimated that the Iran arms sales
generated a $16.1 million surplus for the enterprise, of which a part, $3.8
million, was spent for the Contras before operations stopped; this was the
alleged "diversion." Id. at 343.
121. IRAN-CoNTRA REPORT, supra note 14, at 485 (deposition of Emanuel A.
Floor, app. B, vol. 10).
122. IRAN-CoNTRA REPORT, supra note 14, at 341 (brief description of
financing); 337 (table of sums); 361-66 (DEA ransom operation); 357 (radios);
367-69 (Erria).
123. Approximately $4.4 million dollars was paid in commissions on arms
sales to Secord, Hakim and Clines, and $2.1 million was disbursed as profit
distributions either for personal purposes or into business enterprises such as
submachine gun manufacturing and production of a laser night-vision sight for
military use. Id. at 347, 349-50.
[Vol. 55
LESSONS OF THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAR
participants. Each of these routes had its particular perils. Apart from
obtaining the central bank records of the Enterprise, the Congressional
committees also had the challenge of fleshing out the transactions and
activities to the extent possible from overseas, as well as domestic
witnesses.
1. Swiss Treaty
The most important bank records were from Swiss banks. Swiss
law provides a set of criminal, civil, and contractual liabilities for
revealing information about bank clients; specifically, secrecy violations
by bankers are made criminal by Article 47 of the Swiss Banking
Law.' 2A  As a general matter, only domestic Swiss government
authorities, not foreign governments, can pierce this confidentiality. 125
Efforts to overcome this barrier by treaty culminated in negotiations
between the United States and Switzerland begun in 1973, in response
to increasing evidence that Swiss banks were being used to launder and
hide organized crime money.'2 After four years, in 1977 a Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) went into effect.1"
The treaty has resolved some of the problems posed for American
authorities by Swiss banking secrecy, as did further elaborations in
Swiss law and by a Memorandum of Understanding aimed at securities
fraud.12 That treaty did provide a means for American law enforce-
ment authorities, and specifically the Independent Counsel, to obtain
the Enterprise's Swiss bank records. The Independent Counsel could
show his investigation of specific criminal charges against North,
Secord, and others, such as defrauding the United States. Ultimately,
the Independent Counsel did obtain the Swiss bank records he needed
through that treaty process. As the Iran-Contra Report explains, "The
Committees initially hoped to overcome this obstacle [of Swiss bank
124. Honegger, Demystification of the Swiss Banking Secrecy and Illumina-
tion of the United States-Swiss Memorandum of Understanding, 9 N.C.J. INT'L
L. & COM. REG. 1, 4 (1983).
125. Id. at 5.
126. Nadelmann, supra note 102, at 46 (footnote omitted).
127. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973,
United States-Switzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 (effective Jan. 23,
1977). For a section-by-section analysis of the treaty, see Treaty With the Swiss
Confederation on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, S. Doc. No. F, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
128. For a description of the 1981 Swiss law codifying and expanding the
treaty's provisions, see Nadelmann, supra note 102, at 47, 47 n.32. For a
discussion of the 1982 Memorandum of Understanding, see Honegger, supra
note 124, at 21-29.
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secrecy law] by application to the Swiss authorities pursuant to [the]
- treaty between the United States and Switzerland."'"
The Swiss treaty process, however, poses serious problems for the
efforts of a congressional investigation. First, it takes time. Affected
individuals can take appeals from decisions of Swiss authorities to
comply with American requests, leading to substantial delays. 3° In
this case, Hakim and others did take such appeals, leading to very
substantial delays.
Second, the Congressional investigation faced the likelihood of
considerable resistance. As the report notes, "[a]fter discussions with
the Department of State and research by the staff, however, the
Committees concluded that the Swiss would take the position that the
Committees were not criminal investigative authorities and were
therefore not covered by the Treaty." 3 ' As a general matter, the
Justice Department, which passes on treaty requests to Switzerland,
could be expected on institutional grounds to take a narrow view of
Congressional rights to evidence when their assertion might jeopardize
its relationship with Swiss authorities. In the Iran-Contra matter,
where certain actions by officials of the Justice Department itself were
under investigation, it would have been surprising if the Justice
Department had manifested any special eagerness to take a broad view
of Congressional rights. Thus, the Committees faced the likelihood of
having both the Swiss and the Justice Department against them-both
astride the channel to the documents.
In a variation on the treaty process, as the report notes, "[t]he.
Committees next endeavored to reach an agreement whereby the
Independent Counsel would make copies of the bank records available
to the Committees once he obtained them pursuant to the Treaty;"
however, "[t]he Independent Counsel, because he believed that any such
agreement would prejudice his own chances of obtaining the records,
declined." 3 ' This proved particularly ironic in the end, because the-
Iran-Contra Committees made extensive use of the Swiss bank records
once they obtained them, for analyzing and documenting the wide-
ranging activities of the Enterprise. In contrast, although the Indepen-
129. IRAN-CoNTRA REPORT, supra note 14, at 686.
130. Nadelmann, supra note 104, at 47. The delays necessitated enactment
of two criminal law provisions in 1984, excluding delays to obtain foreign
evidence from the running of the Speedy Trial Act and suspending the statute
of limitations for such delays. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h), 3292 (1975). Nationals
or residents of the United States who file formal oppositions in foreign courts to
official United States requests for evidence must serve a copy of that pleading
on the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 3506 (1982).
131. IRAN-CoNTRA REPORT, supra note 14, at 686.
132. Id at 686-87.
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dent Counsel initially included counts in the indictment of North based
on the alleged diversion of funds, ultimately he had to drop those counts
to avoid unrelated problems connected to the potential disclosure of
classified information. Hence, the Independent Counsel never made
major in-court use in North's trial of the Swiss bank records. The Swiss
Treaty gave him greater rights, for lesser needs, a problem that may
recur in parallel Congressional and criminal investigations of interna-
tional enterprises.
The worst of all worlds would have been for the Congressional
Committees to demand Swiss evidence through the treaty process, and
have the Independent Counsel join the Justice Department and the
Swiss Government in opposing such a demand, collectively complaining
that the demand jeopardized the criminal investigation of the matter.
Such a confrontation would have put the Committees in the position of
being obstructionists, without any guarantee of success to justify such
a position. Accordingly, the Committees made no request to obtain Swiss
bank records through the treaty process.
2. Secord Waiver
A second possible route to the documents was to compel Secord to
consent to their production. As a partner in the Enterprise, Secord
arguably had control over the Enterprise's funds. With his consent, the
banks with Enterprise accounts presumably'3 would agree to provide
copies of the account records. While Secord would not voluntarily give
consent, he could be compelled to sign a consent form or waiver of
secrecy.
Accordingly, the Senate Iran Committee, through a subpoena to
Secord, demanded that he sign such a form. He refused, contending
that requirng him to sign a waiver form amounted to compelling him
to incriminate himself, and, thus, violated his fifth amendment rights.
The Senate Committee countered with the view of some courts of
appeals, which have held that a compelled consent waiver did not
amount to a testimonial communication.
3 4
When Secord still refused to provide a consent form, the Senate
adopted a resolution, invoking the civil enforcement statute for Senate
subpoenas. Pursuant to this statute, the Senate can authorize a
133. This point was never resolved as a factual matter. Secord claimed he
had depended on Hakim to set up and manage the accounts, and it was possible
that Secord could not obtain the records over resistance by Hakim. "When
Secord subsequently agreed voluntarily to provide evidence to the Committees,
he claimed that he had no relevant Swiss bank records and that all such records
were under the control of Hakim." IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 14, at 687.
134. See, e.g., United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814 (11th Cir. 1984).
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committee to bring a civil action "to enforce, to secure a declaratory
judgment concerning the validity of, or to prevent a threatened refusal
or failure to comply with, any subpoena or order issued by the commit-
tee to any natural person to secure the production of documents or other
materials of any kind."1 5 The statute explicitly excludes suits against
executive officials, but for private individuals such as Secord it furnishes
an alternative to criminal prosecution for contempt of Congress when
one is needed for testing good faith legal defenses.
The Senate Committee filed suit in district court, only to suffer a
serious defeat. Although it recognized that several courts of appeals
had upheld the consent form procedure, the district court refused to
follow them." The district court understood well the necessity for the
form, noting that Secord's protests against disclosure of the bank
records "would be of no avail if the Committee had subpoenaed a bank
in the United States. "The laws of countries such as Switzerland,
however, require a bank to obtain the consent of its customers before
releasing their records.' 117  Nevertheless, it refused to require a
consent form, since it considered that "[b]y signing the directive, Secord
would be testifying just as clearly as if he were forced to verbally assert
his consent."'8
From this decision the Senate Committee appealed. Ultimately, the
appeal was dismissed as moot on the Senate Committee's motion, once
the records were obtained through the other method discussed below.
Ironically, the following year, the Supreme Court upheld the consent
waiver procedure, vindicating (too late) the Senate Committee's position.
In Doe v. United States,"39 a grand jury sought a court order that a
target of its fraud investigation (named throughout as "John Doe") "sign
12 forms consenting to disclosure of any bank records respectively
relating to 12 foreign bank accounts [in the Cayman Islands and
135. 28 U.S.C. § 1364 (1982). This statute applies only to Senate proceed-
ings. Congress enacted it as part of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978,
following a recommendation from the Senate Watergate Committee to create
such a mechanism for resolving disputes with witnesses. The conference report
on the bill explained that the statute did not include the House because the
relevant House committees had not yet considered the proposal for judicial
enforcement of House subpoenas. H.R. REP. No. 1756, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 80
(1978). The particular resolution for this suit was S. Res. 170, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess., 133 CONG. REC. 53,562 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1987). For a description of the
Senate civil enforcement procedure, see J. GRABOW, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGA-
TIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.4[c] (1988).
136. Senate Select Comm. v. Secord, 664 F. Supp. 562 (D.D.C. 1987).
137. Id. at 565.
138. Id.
139. 487 U.S. 201 (1988).
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Bermuda] over which the Government knew or suspected that Doe had
control."
Doe asserted his fifth amendment rights, but the Supreme Court
concluded that the compelled consent form was not testimonial in
nature. "[I]n order to be testimonial, an accused's communication must
itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose
information. Only then is a person compelled to be a 'witness' against
himself."140 Since the compelled consent procedure did not require
that Doe "acknowledge that an account in a foreign financial institu-
tion... [was] in existence or that it... [was] controlled by [him]," and
"[did] not point the Government toward hidden accounts or otherwise
provide information that... [would] assist the prosecution in uncover-
ing evidence," the Court viewed compelling a signature to such a form
as no more a violation of the fifth amendment than "be[ing] forced to
surrender a key to a strong box containing incriminating
docunents.'
41
The Doe decision opened up a vital tool for investigation in the
future. It came too late, however, to assist the Iran-Contra investiga-
tion, which was forced to use a different route.
3. Hakim Immunization
A remaining option for the Committees was to obtain the records
from Hakim. This was a particularly sensitive and difficult decision.
Hakim was telling the Committees, through his counsel, that he was not
in the United States, and that he would not come to the United States,
at least at that moment, to provide evidence.. Thus, he could not be
personally served with process, and if an arrangement was made, the
evidence would have to be obtained from him overseas. Moreover,
Hakim himself, as a private businessman who had profited personally
from a series of uncertain arms sales, was not an attractive person to
immunize.
The decision to obtain the records through immunizing Hakim
involved members and counsel for the Committees personally going to
Paris to conduct a session in which Hakim was immunized. He, then,
turned over the Enterprise records. That session ranks as one of the
boldest actions of the investigation, and one which, in retrospect, proved
the soundest. As the report described the decision:
The Committees decided that, to obtain the critical financial records,
they would have to obtain an order of use immunity for Hakim. After
the order was obtained, Hakim produced his records, and equally
140. Id. at 9 (footnote omitted).
141. Id at 9 n.9, 14.
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important, assisted in interpreting them through his compelled
testimony. The evidence thus obtained was indispensable to the
Committees in tracing the flow of money in the Iran-Contra Af-
fair.
42
Even as a negotiated arrangement with immunity, obtaining the
records from Hakim posed some sensitive issues. Hakim insisted that
the records would only be produced at a session in Paris. Both to
establish the Committee's own investigative process, and to satisfy
Hakim about the authoritativeness of his immunization, the Committees
desired to cloak the Chief Counsel with the maximum Congressional
authority.
Hence, the House Committee employed a familiar device-the
"commission" procedure-in obtaining information overseas for civil
litigation. As described in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 28(b), this
procedure consists of an order (the "commission") from a domestic court
empowering an individual (the "commissioner") to obtain evidence in
another country and to bring it back. It contrasts both with letters
rogatory, for which process goes to a foreign court, and with domestic
deposition practice, which occurs on notice without process going to or
from any court. 4 3 As part of the routine nature of commissions, State
Department regulations make consular officials available as commis-
sioners.'" In this instance, the House Committee issued a commis-
sion, much like a subpoena in format, to further document the Chief
Counsel's authority to obtain the evidence from Hakim.
D. Specific Issues
1. Overseas Reach of United States Process for
Corporate and Bank Records
Several major issues arise in Congressional investigations of
international "enterprises:" jurisdiction over records that are out of the
country; foreign secrecy laws; and availability of tools such as commis-
sions and letters rogatory. At the outset, a key factor is the broad view
142. IRAN-CoNTRA REPORT, supra note 14, at 687.
143. Rule 28(b) provides in pertinent part:
In a foreign country, depositions may be taken.., before a person
commissioned by the court, and a person so commissioned shall have
the power by virtue of his commission to administer any necessary
oath and take testi-mony .... A commission... shall be issued on
application and notice and on terms that are just and appropriate.
FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b).
144. See 22 C.F.R. § 92.55 (1989).
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taken by the federal courts of the reach of United States jurisdiction and
law. To the immense irritation of other countries, United States courts
refuse to confine themselves to United States territory either in
exercising jurisdiction or even in the overruling of foreign secrecy laws.
In one of the leading cases, a grand jury seeking drug-related evidence
subpoenaed the Bank of Nova Scotia for records in its branches in the
Bahamas and Cayman Islands. The Bank has branches in the United
States. When the bank failed to produce records in timelr fashion,
145
a district court held it in civil contempt and assessed a fine of
$1,825,000. The governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, and the
Cayman Islands appeared as amici curiae in support of the bank, and
"[the Government of Canada vigorously asserted that the situs of the
records is of utmost significance and that, absent extraordinary
circumstances, the law of the jurisdiction [i.e., the Cayman secrecy law]
must prevail.'
146
In 1984, the Court of Appeals rejected that position, declaring:
The foreign origin of the subpoenaed documents should not be a
decisive factor. The nationality of the Bank is Canadian, but its
presence is pervasive in the United States. The Bank has voluntarily
elected to do business in numerous foreign host countries and has
accepted the incidental risk of occasional inconsistent governmental
actions. It cannot expect to avail itself of the benefits of doing
business here without accepting the concomitant obligations.14
With the territorial barrier down at least for some exercises of
American jurisdiction and law, the question becomes how far the courts
will push their reach, and how far the Congress can do so either in
investigations or in legislation. As to jurisdiction, the Iran-Contra
matter itself brought a sharp reminder that the courts still set limits.
The Independent Counsel flexed his subpoena power to serve a
145. In re Grand Jury Proceedings Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817,819-
20 (11th Cir. 1984). The records requests for Cayman and Bahamian records
followed different paths. In the Cayman Islands, in May 1983, and again in
November 1983, the Grand Court issued orders (on the bank's petition) not to
produce the documents. Finally, the Governor of the Islands authorized the
disclosure of the subpoenaed documents pursuant to a provision in the secrecy
law allowing him to do so. In the Bahamas, the Attorney General of the
Bahamas issued an order allowing the bank to produce the requested docu-
ments. The contempt fine issued thereafter came largely because production
was still tardy, with undisclosed withholding that was only corrected later upon
outside inspection, even with these permissions, but part of the fine did come
from pre-permission refusals to produce documents. Id at 821-23.
146. Id at 828 n.17.
147. Id. at 828 (footnote omitted).
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subpoena duces tecum on Albert Hakim, as custodian, for records of
eight companies allegedly under his control. Hakim refused to produce
the records, asserting, among other grounds, that the court lacked
jurisdiction over the companies. A district court rejected the argument
and held him in civil contempt.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed the district court and ruled for Hakim. It
noted that "the District Court unquestionably had personal jurisdiction
over [Hakim] since he is a United States citizen."'48 The court held,
however, that to obtain corporate records, the Independent Counsel had
to obtain personal jurisdiction, not over Hakim as the corporations'
representative, but over the corporations themselves. 149 The court of
appeals tested such personal jurisdiction by the traditional due process
standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,15° namely, wheth-
er the foreign corporations themselves had "minimum contacts" with the
United States; alternatively, "[i]n the case of foreign companies that do
not regularly do business here, jurisdiction may be founded on conduct
abroad that causes injury within the United States."''
It left to the Independent Counsel the task of making such a
showing, allowing him to meet a "lower hurdle" to "establish jurisdiction
for purposes of enforcing a grand jury subpoena" than would be needed
"for purposes of trial.' 52  The Court of Appeals distinguished the
Bank of Nova Scotia case on the straightforward ground that the Bank
of Nova Scotia itself "did considerable business in the United States
[and] therefore plainly had the 'minimum contacts' with this country to
establish jurisdiction" while there had been no showing of "business
[done] in the United States on behalf of [Hakim's] companies.
' 53
The decision on Hakim's corporations points to the two different
bases for personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations. First, the
corporations may have regular contacts with the United States sufficient
to establish their "minimum contacts" for due process purposes.,The
Supreme Court described this basis in the 1983 case, Helicopteros
148. In re Sealed Case, 832 F.2d 1268, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The decision
does not name the litigant, but the litigant who is the subject of this decision is
in circumstances which appear to be Hakim's. We are accordingly referring to
Hakim as that litigant for purposes of analysis.
149. Id. at 1272-73.
150. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). For recent cases discussing this test, see
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
151. Sealed Case, 832 F.2d at 1274.
152. Id. at 1274.
153. Id. at 1273 n.3.
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Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall,15 as that of "general jurisdic-
tion," such as when a foreign corporation carries on "continuous and
systematic" activity in the United States. Alternatively, as the Hakim
decision explained "[in the case of foreign companies that do not
regularly do business here, jurisdiction may be founded on conduct
abroad that causes injury within the United States."'15  Helicopteros
Nacionales described this as the "specific jurisdiction" basis, applicable
"[w]hen a controversy is related to or 'arises out of a defendant's
contacts with the forum."'5
The Hakim decision marks out the ultimate limits of United States
jurisdiction for corporate evidence: either "minimum contacts" on a
regular basis, or effects on the United States from particular conduct.
Presumably a Congressional subpoena, like a grand jury subpoena,
would be held to reach to the full constitutional limit of such jurisdic-
tion. Congressional subpoenas, like grand jury subpoenas, have the
force of the federal government behind them and are restrained only by
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. While due process
limitations apply to all subpoenas, due process may impose different
limitations in different contexts. The personal jurisdiction limits
discussed most often by the Supreme Court concern private tort suits
and the reach of state long-arm statutes. Enforcement of federal
subpoenas, though, lacks the restraint required in state-court private
tort cases that the Supreme Court noted in 1982: "that the requirement
of personal jurisdiction, as applied to state courts, reflects an element
of federalism and the character of state sovereignty vis-a-vis other
States. 16 7 In the case of federal subpoenas, the reach is as far as the
constitutional power of the federal government, unrestrained by the
federalist concessions made by the individual states."5
As to congressional subpoenas, from the very first Supreme Court
decision on congressional process, Anderson v. Dunn159 in 1821, the
Supreme Court has treated the reach of such process as the same as
"the limits of the legislating powers of that body [i.e., Congress]," giving
potentially contemptuous witnesses only the consolation that "[i]f the
154. 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1984) (quotations omitted).
155. Sealed Case, 832 F.2d at 1274.
156. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 (quotations omitted). This was a test
which the District of Columbia Circuit intended the district court to apply on
remand.
157. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694, 702-03, 703 n.10 (1982).
158. For a discussion of the potent reach of federal grand jury subpoenas
aimed at overseas documents, see In re Marc Rich & Co., 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215 (1983).
159. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
1990]
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
inconvenience be urged, the reply is obvious; there is no difficulty in
observing that respectful deportment which-will render all apprehension
chimerical."'" The Court has consistently maintained on other
questions the equivalence of the reach of Congress's investigative and
legislative powers, and could be expected to continue to do so in this
context.161
With respect to foreign bank accounts, these limits on United States
jurisdiction produce a strange line. Subpoenas, including congressional
subpoenas, can obtain records from those foreign banks with the
requisite minimum contacts in the United States. Foreign banks that
absolutely lack contacts in the United States, however, would argue that
they should escape subpoenas for records of transactions not clearly
involving conduct that causes injury within the United States.
It may be that through negotiation of bilateral treaties and similar
approaches,. the United States judicial and legislative systems can
obtain the evidence they need despite this limitation. In the Iran-
Contra matter itself, the Independent Counsel did obtain the records it
needed through the Swiss treaty process; it just took a long time. On
the other hand, if international "enterprise" develops in a way that
hides more and more behind banks without direct, demonstrable United
States contacts, Congress might have to respond with more aggressive
steps. Most simply, but most roughly, Congress could legislate
sanctions against countries that serve as havens for the most egregious
enterprises, such as Caribbean bank secrecy havens with large flows of
narcotics proceeds, and that refuse to enter into Mutual Assistance
Legal Treaties or similar treaties allowing investigative access.
A more legally complex approach would have Congress seek, either
as part of a specific Congressional investigation, or through enactment
of a statute making legislative findings and establishing procedures for
investigations generally, to secure jurisdiction over foreign banks
involved in the stream of transactions that reach the United States.
This would follow the "stream of commerce" reasoning used to support
160. Id. at 234-35. In that nineteenth century era, it was a bold step for the
Court to hold that congressional process could go beyond state boundaries and
reach anywhere in the country. Although the Court indicated that congressional
investigative power could cross state boundaries, the era was one of general
territorial limits on legislative and investigative powers. See id. at 234 ("We
know no bounds that can be prescribed to its rang but those of the United
States."). The same concept of full reach would, under today's long-arm
concepts, mean the application of "minimum contacts" and "domestic impact"
tests.
161. "TIhe scope of the power of inquiry... is as penetrating and far.
reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the Constitu-
tion." Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 n.15
(1975) (quoting Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959)).
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Congressional statutes invoking the interstate nature of commerce as
a basis for federal law. Congress has both the authority and the
information to judge the benefits for foreign banks in participating in
that stream, and the burdens for them in responding to United States
subpoenas. If Congress used that authority and information generally
to seek jurisdiction over foreign banks involved in that stream, it could
expect a generous, although arguably not absolute, measure of judicial
deference on whether it was meeting the constitutional limits involved
in due process.'6 2
Congress's conclusions about how the world financial system
functions, and that system's high significance of indirect access to the
United States market, even for banks which stay offshore, should
receive deference from the courts. As previously noted, in the 1974 case
upholding a series of burdensome requirements on banks involving,
among other matters, reporting of foreign transactions, the Supreme
Court gave great weight to the findings and procedures established by
Congress following hearings on illegal international enterprise.
1
6
2. Overseas Reach of United States Process
for Individual Evidence
Interesting questions of a different nature arose when the Iran-
Contra committees pursued elusive individual witnesses. One question
is very basic: whether a United States citizen who is served in another
country must obey the summons. Hakim fled overseas. Another
important figure in the matter was the attorney Willard Zucker, an
American citizen settled in Switzerland. The Supreme Court has settled
the constitutionality of the general statute for summoning citizens back
to testify in criminal cases, with one prominent use of the statute
ironically being none other than an effort in the 1960s to bring back to
the United States Meyer Lansky.'6
No case has applied that general statute to Congressional hearings,
and some well-known individuals have left the country to avoid being
served with a subpoena to testify, such as Bebe Rebozo, President
Nixon's friend, who went on a long cruise during the Watergate
investigation." In 1964, however, Congress amended the statute
162. For a recent discussion of the interaction of Congress and the courts
in the similar context of fourth amendment limitations on investigative means,
see Fisher, Congress and the Fourth Amendment, 21 GA. L. REV. 107 (1986).
163. Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 27-28 (1974).
164. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932), upheld the statute.
United States v. Lansky, 496 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1974), described Lansky's case.
165. S. DAsH, CHIEF CoUNsEL: INSIDE THE ERvIN COMMITEE-THE
UNTOLD STORY OF WATERGATE 245 (1976).
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specifically to broaden its use beyond criminal cases.1" Congress
generally uses the same procedural tools-writs, immunity orders,
subpoenas, contempt-that courts do to obtain witne~ses.
Witnesses may go beyond merely leaving, or staying away, all in
the open, by resorting to hiding, thus, aggressively evading testifying.
During the initial months of the Iran-Contra matter, Hakim kept his
whereabouts secret, communicating only through counsel. This was one
of his trump cards in negotiating the arrangements for his coming
forward and providing evidence under immunity. Traditionally, like
criminal and civil subpoenas of the courts, Congressional subpoenas
have been served in hand, without the kinds of substituted or other
service (such as leaving process at the last known residence) used for
service of complaints in civil cases, particularly "long-arm" service of
out-of-state defendants. 67 Accordingly, over the years, many witness-
es have simply hidden from Congressional investigations. One example
was the historic disappearance of William Rockefeller, who, despite
being the retired head of possibly the most powerful company in the
world and one of the world's wealthiest individuals, aggressively hid
from the, Senate's Pujo Committee (the "Money Trust" investigation) in
1912-13: "For seven months the elusive businessman could not be found
at any of his several places of residence.""6  Regarding Hakim, the
Iran-Contra Committees, like many Congressional investigations, had
too great a need to move expeditiously to outwait a patient witness
determined to stonewall.
At present, committees generally deal with evasive witnesses by
dogged pursuit and strategy. If Congress faces some flagrant cases of
evasion by witnesses who have solid roots-businesses, homes,
families-it might ultimately choose to employ something like substitut-
ed service of civil complaints. For example, pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1), a civil complaint can be served either by
166. See 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1982). As amended, the statute could be used "in
otherthan a criminal action or proceeding, if the court finds, in addition, that
it is not possible to obtain his testimony in admissible form without his personal
appearance or to obtain the production of the document or other thing in any
other manner." Id. The statute was amended by Pub. L. No. 88-619, § 10(a),
78 Stat. 997 (1964). A congressional committee might have a choice between
using its own subpoena, applying pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1982) for a
judicial subpoena, or it might use both. Such options are not unusual. A
recalcitrant Senate witness may, in the end, be in contempt either of a Senate
subpoena or a court order pursuant to the Senate civil enforcement statute.
167. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 45 (in-hand service of civil subpoenas) and
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17 (in-hand service of criminal subpoenas) with FED. R. Civ. P.
4 (substituted service of civil process).
168. R. N. SHELDON, The Pujo Committee, 1912, in 3 CONGRESS INVESTI-
GATES: 1792-1972, at 2267 (A. Schlesinger & R. Bruns. ed. 1975).
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delivering the complaint to the defendant personally, "or by leaving
copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein."'69
Similar service of a Congressional subpoena would presumably be
upheld against due process challenges, so long as the prosecution of a
contempt or obstruction of Congress charge proved (by direct or
circumstantial evidence) that the witness had actual notice of the
subpoena and a meaningful opportunity to be heard on it.
'3. Bank Secrecy Laws
Quite apart from these issues regarding obtaining jurisdiction over
witnesses, once they do obtain jurisdiction, the courts and Congress face
separate issues concerning the application of foreign secrecy laws. The
issue received its most extensive consideration from the Supreme Court
in 1957 in Societe International Pour Participations Industrielles v.
Rogers."0 In Rogers, the United States during World War II had
seized I.G. Farben's American interests, and a Swiss holding company
had sued for the return of those interests. In that suit, document
discovery on behalf of the United States government was resisted by a
Swiss banking firm allegedly tied to I.G. Farben and the Swiss holding
company. The dispute reached the point that the Swiss Federal
Attorney confiscated the bank's documents to prevent their disclosure
in violation of Swiss law.'
7'
The Supreme Court refused to accept the claim that Swiss secrecy
law excused refusal to produce the records. It emphasized the intent of
"the Congress when it broadened the Trading with the Enemy Act in
1941,... to reach enemy interests which masqueraded under those
innocent fronts."'7 2  It "would undermine congressional policies...
and invite efforts to place ownership of American assets in persons or
firms whose sovereign assures secrecy of records" if "fear of punishment
under the laws of its sovereign precludes a court from finding that
petitioner had 'control' over them." 73 Since then the same logic has
encouraged lower courts to effectuate Congressional policies in the tax,
drug, and securities fraud laws by refusing to accept claims of foreign
secrecy laws.
Societe Internationale, together with the previously discussed Bank
of Nova Scotia case in the court of appeals, show that American courts
169. FED. R. Civ. P. (4)(d)(1).
170. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
171. Id. at 199-200.





do not always honor such laws, but that is a far cry from regarding such
laws as nullities in every instance. For example, in the 1988 decision
in United States v. Rubin,'74 the Eighth Circuit upheld a Cayman
Islands bank manager's refusal to give evidence in a major stock fraud
case. Pursuant to waivers of the Cayman secrecy law by the court-
appointed receiver for a defunct Cayman company, the manager
testified as a key witness for the prosecution regarding specific empty
company accounts misrepresented by the defendants as containing $8
million. The defense sought records and testimony from the bank
manager regarding other accounts for which there were no waivers. In
light of the applicability of the Cayman bank secrecy law, the district
court issued an order, upheld by the court of appeals, precluding
questioning the bank manager of those other accounts.
175
In upholding the claim of bank secrecy, the Eighth Circuit
distinguished Bank of Nova Scotia because in that case "the government
was seeking the bank records of United States citizens who ... [were]
the target of a United States criminal proceeding... to determine if a
United States citizen... [had] violated laws of the United States.
17
"By contrast, here [defendant] Rubin is attempting to obtain the records
of Cayman Island residents who are neither the target of a United
States criminal proceeding nor subject to the laws of the United
States."177 The Eighth Circuit applied the same multi-factor test of
other courts, and because it sustained the-shield of the Cayman secrecy
law, it made the operation of that test more visible.
1 78
The test is a balancing test derived from section 40 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of the Foreign Relations Laws of the United States,
which provides:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of
law and the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct
upon the part of a person, each state is required by international law
to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement
jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent
enforcement actions would impose upon the person,
174. 836 F.2d 1096 (8th Cir. 1987).
175. Id. at 1098-100.
176. I& at 1102.
177. Id. A number of other factors went into the Eighth Circuit decision,
including lack of materiality of the other accounts, since almost no money had
been shifted into them from accounts regarding which the defendant had made
the fraudulent representations. Id
178. Id. at 1101.
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(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the
territory of the other states
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can
reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed
by that state.'7 9
For a foreign bank secrecy provision; courts typically look quite
hard at factor (b), the hardship to the bank if it violates its country's
secrecy law. ' The Supreme Court in Societe Internationale described
"fear of criminal prosecution" as "a weighty excuse for non-production,"
while still saying that the record-holder was in the "most advantageous
position to plead with its own sovereign for relaxation of penal laws or
for adoption of plans that will at the least achieve a significant measure
of compliance with the production order," and that what the courts
should do "depends upon the circumstances of a given case."'
8'
Some courts have respected foreign bank secrecy laws on this
ground; others have not. In Rubin, the Eighth Circuit had been
"persuaded that if [the bank manager] were required to testify absent
account waivers, the hardship to him would be great. He would be
subject to criminal penalties which include a fine and incarcera-
tion."'8 2  This was a major factor in not enforcing the defendant's
subpoena. On the other hand, Bank of Nova Scotia ordered disclosure
despite the threat of prosecution of the bank for violation of the Cayman
secrecy law:
As the Second Circuit noted years ago, "If the Bank cannot, as it were,
serve two masters and comply with the lawful requirements both of
the United States and Panama, perhaps it should surrender to one
sovereign or the other the privileges received therefrom."'"
The Court pointedly drew on both executive and congressional
concerns in this regard: "Congress, as well as the Executive Branch,
has long been 'concerned about [the] serious and widespread use of
foreign financial institutions, located in jurisdictions with strict laws of
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES.§ 40 (1965).
180. United States v. Rubin, 836 F.2d 1096, 1102 (8th Cir. 1987).
181. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles v. Rogers, 357
U.S. 197, 205-06, 211 (1958).
182. Rubin, 836 F.2d at 1102.
183. In re Grand Jury Proceedings Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817, 828
(11th Cir. 1984) (quoting First Nat'l City Bank v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616,620 (2d Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960)).
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secrecy as to bank activity, for the purpose of violating or evading
domestic criminal, tax and regulatory enactments." '1
These cases show why Congressional investigations should, and
hopefully will, be able to pierce these barriers. Even for non-criminal
matters, congressional authorities (and agencies, such as the SEC) have
"vital national interests" in conducting investigations."' Such areas
as corporate payments and private quasi-governmental operations, even
were they completely non-criminal, have profound implications for
United States policy; therefore, investigations of these are vital for the
conduct of government.
4. Techniques of International Investigation
A question of particular interest in congressional investigations
concerns what tools are available to investigate overseas matters.
Congress has some standard-and some not so standard-methods for
obtaining evidence itself. Of course, it can hold hearings domestically
in which foreigners testify. Once they have been validly served, non-
citizens have the same obligations as citizens. One court held, in
sustaining a contempt conviction for a witness who refused to take the
oath at a Congressional hearing: "Although he is an alien, appellant
stood before the Committee in much the same position as does any
citizen of the United States."'186 For example, Adolfo Calero, the
Contra leader who had worked with North, proved to be a key witness
both in the Iran-Contra Committee hearings and in the prosecution of
North.
Congressional committees also, on occasion, may hold hearings
overseas. The Iran-Contra Committees, like most congressional
investigations, chose not to use that option, instead bringing its overseas
evidence back to the United States for hearings. One example of a
committee that chose to hold overseas hearings was a House subcommit-
tee inspecting the construction of a network of United States bases in
Western Europe that had been experiencing supply problems. Like
most congressional overseas trips, it received information primarily by
visits, briefings, and conferences, but it supplemented these with
184. Id. at 827 (quoting California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 27
(1974)). Similarly, the Second Circuit called on the "strong national interest in
safeguarding the integrity of its criminal process" and 1984 congressional
legislation to sustain demands for Cayman records in United States v. Davis,
767 F.2d 1025, 1037 (2d Cir. 1985).
185. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.. 178, 187 (1957).
186. Eisler v. United States, 170 F.2d 273,279 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 335
U.S. 857 (1948), cert. dismissed, 338 U.S. 883 (1949).
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hearings designed to dig into the types of construction problems which
could best be analyzed by a more formal hearing process. 8 7
To obtain testimony overseas, a committee may authorize its staff
to conduct depositions. The writer of a recent treatise explained the
deposition's use:
The deposition procedure may be used for varied reasons when it is
expedient to obtain testimony without a member present-for
example, to fill in the details of a complex investigation, to question
witnesses outside of Washington while avoiding the inconvenience of
conducting a field hearing, or to provide background information for
use in later questioning of witnesses at a hearing. Depositions may
be used by a committee in place of closed hearings, with a large
number of members and staff present, to minimize leaking of witness'
testimony in advance of public hearings."s
The writer pointed out the importance of the technique in international
investigations: "An intensive investigation like that of the Iran-Contra
affair often will make ample use of this technique, having its staff take
hundreds of depositions throughout the world."'189 As described above
regarding the Hakim deposition, on occasion, the taking of overseas
depositions may be bolstered by providing an official authorization, or
"commission," to the deposition-taker. Another potential procedure is
the videotaped deposition, now routinely used in civil litigation.
Another question has been the potential for use of letters rogatory
by Congressional investigations. Rule 28(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure explains: "A letter rogatory may be addressed To the
Appropriate Authority in [here name the country]. '"" In contrast to
a deposition notice or commission, which directs Congressional staff or
agents to question witnesses, a letter rogatory asks a foreign court or
187. SUBCOMM. ON MILTARY OPERATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, REPORT OF AN INSPECTION TRIP TO CERTAIN
SELECTED MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN EUROPE, SEPTEMBER 1954, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1955). The subcommittee's report includes its schedule of briefings,
conferences, and hearings. The Subcommittee explained that "[a] transcript was
taken of each briefimg and hearing during the course of this trip. For the most
part these transcripts are classified and thus unavailable to the public." Id.
188. J. Grabow, supra note 133, § 3.3. For descriptions of the deposition
procedure and sample documents, see Appendix to the Inquiry Into the Matter
of Billy Carter and Libya Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate the
Activities of Individuals Representing the Interests of Foreign Governments of
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1741-70 (1980).
189. J. Grabow, supra note 133, § 3.3.
190. FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b).
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similar authority to do the questioning.' This procedure facilitates
use of that country's own compulsory means for obtaining evidence, such
as a foreign court which, upon receiving through channels a letter
rogatory, issues its own subpoena to a witness, when United States
process would be either dubious or completely useless. The Iran-Contra
committees had authority to apply for letters rogatory,192 but in light
of the pace of the investigation, did not do so. Previous investigations,
notably the House Select Committee on Assassinations, however, had
used the procedure as it methodically ran down overseas leads.
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CONCLUSION
Congress's effort to investigate the Iran-Contra matter forced it to
confront two of the most daunting legal obstacles to investigations
today: the problems of "use" immunity where the key witnesses for a
Congressional investigation also are likely targets of criminal charges,
and the problems of international "enterprises" with finances cloaked in
foreign secrecy barriers. Only by complex and subtle timing of "use"
immunity, and extensive negotiation with the possessors of "enterprise"
information, did the Congressional investigation surmount these
obstacles. Future investigations will profit from a study of these efforts
of the Iran-Contra investigation. Moreover, Congress should review its
contempt, immunity, and international investigative authorities to
determine whether they allow it to shape the laws so the United States
has power to detect and overcome global stratagems for evading legal
or political accountability.
191. Id. (letter rogatory addressed to "appropriate authority" in foreign
country).
192. The Senate Committee's charter, S. Res. 23, authorized it in section
5(d)(5) "to make application for issuance of letters rogatory." S. RES. 23, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
193. In re Application of United States House of Representatives Select
Committee on Assassinations, Misc. No. 78-0120 (D.D.C. April 19, 1978) (used
to inquire into James Earl Ray's activities in Portugal in May, 1968), reprinted
in Legislative and Administrative Reform: Appendix to Hearings Before the
House Select Comm. on Assassinations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 134 (1978).
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